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THE SUPREME COURT
2017 TERM
FOREWORD:
RIGHTS AS TRUMPS?
Jamal Greene∗
I. INTRODUCTION

R

ights are more than mere interests, but they are not absolute. And
so two competing frames have emerged for adjudicating conflicts
over rights. Under the first frame, rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be limited. Constitutional adjudication within this frame is primarily an interpretive exercise fixed
on identifying the substance and reach of any constitutional rights at
issue. Under the second frame, rights are limited but for the exceptional
circumstances in which they are absolute. Adjudication within this
frame is primarily an empirical exercise fixed on testing the government’s justification for its action. In one frame, the paradigm cases of
rights infringement arise as the consequences of governing poorly. In
the other, the paradigm cases arise as the costs of governing well.
The first frame describes the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court
over roughly the last half century. The second frame describes the approach of the rest of the developed world over the same period. Neither
frame is perfect; many of their flaws track the inherent limits of judicial
review in a democracy. The two frames might indeed produce similar
results in particular cases. But across time and space, the choice of
frame has profound consequences for constitutional law and for its subjects. In particular, the first frame, the one that dominates U.S. courts,
has special pathologies that ill prepare its practitioners to referee the
paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic political order.
To wit, two men, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, wanted a cake
for their wedding.1 They visited a bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful comments and criticism, I thank
Jessie Allen, Akhil Reed Amar, Nicholas Bagley, Randy Barnett, Seyla Benhabib, Evan Bernick,
Deborah Brake, Samuel Issacharoff, Vicki Jackson, Jeremy Kessler, Suzanne Kim, Gillian Metzger,
Henry Monaghan, David Pozen, Jedediah Purdy, Jack Rakove, Russell Robinson, Fred Schauer,
Sarah Seo, Reva Siegel, Yvonne Tew, students at the Georgetown Advanced Constitutional Law
symposium, participants at workshops at Columbia Law School and the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law, and the editors of the Harvard Law Review. I owe special thanks to Katherine Yon
Ebright, Michael Lemanski, Zach Piaker, Swara Saraiya, and Sophie Schuit for indispensable research assistance.
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
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Lakewood, Colorado, where they were told by the owner and chef, Jack
Phillips, that his Christian religious beliefs prevented him from baking
custom cakes for same-sex weddings.2 Discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation violates Colorado’s public accommodation law,3 and
Craig and Mullins sued to require that the law be enforced against
Phillips.4 Phillips answered that, for him, designing cakes was a form
of artistic expression, and so requiring him to do so for a same-sex wedding violated his constitutional rights not just to freedom of religion but
to freedom of speech as well.5
In the artistic spirit, consider two portraits of the dispute that became
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.6
Within one frame we observe a dispute among friends, citizens who
share a core set of values but who are quibbling — vigorously, to be
sure — over how those values apply to a particular set of facts. That
core includes the view that art is a protected form of expression that the
state may not compel an artist to produce against his will.7 What’s
more, conditioning Phillips’s ability to operate a bakery on the state’s
controlling the content of his art would count, prima facie, as a forbidden compulsion.8 Both sides likewise agree that a free speech defense
would not permit Phillips to refuse to sell cakes to Craig and Mullins
simply because they are gay men.9 Phillips’s argument was not
grounded in a generalized right of association or autonomy that would
allow him to engage consensually with whomever he chooses and on
whatever terms. His was a subtler claim, a pinpoint in the canvas, and
the couple’s rebuttal was equally so. Phillips has his rights, so do Craig
and Mullins, and, crucially, so do the people of the State of Colorado in
whose name its public accommodation law speaks. This is a portrait of
rights on all sides, reconcilable only at retail, if at all.
Within the other frame rests a darker portrait, a legal Guernica cluttered with slippery slopes, law school hypotheticals, and assorted horribles on parade. At oral argument, Justice Gorsuch asked David Cole,
representing the couple for the ACLU, whether the Colorado law would
require a baker to sell a cake with a cross on it to a member of the Ku
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2
3
4
5
6
7

Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725.
Id. at 1726.
138 S. Ct. 1719.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, 78, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16111), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y4HB-ZM6M].
8 See id. at 78.
9 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111);
Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 2–3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (No. 16-111); Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 3, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
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Klux Klan.10 Justice Alito asked the State’s Solicitor General whether
the law could force the baker to provide a cake honoring the anniversary
of Kristallnacht.11 Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan both compared
Masterpiece Cakeshop to Ollie’s Barbecue, the “whites only” Alabama
restaurant that challenged the public accommodation provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 One does not align another with Nazis and
segregationists to be friendly or subtle. Rather, these pathological cases
signal the outlandishness of the position they are recruited to support.13
This is a portrait of rights on one side, bad faith on the other, and powerful disagreement about which is which. This conflict is reconcilable
only at wholesale, and without mercy to the loser.
This categorical, zero-sum frame reflects a noble instinct. Professor
Ronald Dworkin gave the most articulate expression to the idea that
rights are best conceived as “trumps.”14 Dworkin argued that to subject
rights to balancing against the public good is to deny them altogether.15
But one consequence of rarely subjecting rights to balancing is that the
rights themselves must be articulated with care and specificity. The line
demarcating those who hold rights and those who do not becomes a
momentous one that merits the attention of lawmakers, citizens, and
adjudicators. Dworkin emphasized that, inasmuch as it is concerned
with rights, the Constitution’s attention should be rewarding; it follows
that its attention must likewise be precious.
This frame creates many problems for constitutional law. For one
thing, it is ill-equipped to address the core conflicts that populate the
constitutional dockets of U.S. courts. Within a mature rights culture,
the typical cases that reach deep into the appellate courts and up to the
Supreme Court do not arise from the wholesale denials of citizenship
that preoccupied Dworkin but rather from workaday acts of governance
from which individuals seek retail exemption: a zealous licensing
scheme, a questionable automobile search or dog sniff, a novel or annoying time, place, or manner restriction on speech or gun possession.
The paradigm cases that might once have been thought to justify judicial review — racial segregation, McCarthyism, and the like — are no
longer paradigmatic, if they ever were.
Less momentous cases sit uneasily within a rights-as-trumps frame.
The frame induces our identification of rights to track the categories
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10
11
12

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 87.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 18–19, 37; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–98 (1964) (describing the
discriminatory practice at Ollie’s Barbecue).
13 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 462 (1985) (defining “pathologies” to which Blasi argues First Amendment doctrine ought
to respond).
14 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977).
15 Id. at 192.
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judges are able to access, articulate, and delimit rather than the moral,
political, or even constitutional justice the rights mean to promote. And
so Americans have a right to market pharmaceuticals to doctors16 or to
parlay the corporate form into electioneering expenditures,17 both of
which the Court categorizes as “speech,”18 but no federal constitutional
right to food, shelter, or education, which are harder to corral. The
Court’s two major partisan gerrymandering cases this Term model the
constitutional distortion rights as trumps produces. Judges fear holding
that they can adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims not because
such claims are fallacious or frivolous — most members of the Court
seem to agree that partisan gerrymandering is antidemocratic — but rather because such claims are intuitive and inviting.
The tension between judges’ intuitions about justice and their understandings of the bounds of inherited categories leads to a second
problem: typically tacit (and therefore baffling) distortions of the categories themselves. We all have our favorite examples of the Court pretending to apply rational basis review but instead applying a heightened
form of scrutiny,19 or vice versa.20 When an ex ante choice of category
largely determines the ex post decision, manipulation of that choice is to
be expected: to deny a rights claim within this framework is to say the
right does not exist.21 And so these cases do not reflect lawlessness tout
court, a standard accusation,22 so much as a breakdown in legal form,
not so unlike resort to equity to surmount the limits of common law
pleading. Still, lack of transparency about the basis for decision is a
rule-of-law problem that the rights-as-trump frame invites.
A third problem has been less recognized but might be most damaging. The costs of the rights-as-trumps frame extend beyond substantive
constitutional justice and legal form and into a relational register. Constitutional law is not just a set of foundational rules and standards that
govern the structure of the constituted government and the behavior of
its actors. It is also a style of — a grammar for — political argument.23
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
16
17
18
19

See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010).
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–35 (1996); id. at 640–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985); id. at 456 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227–30
(1982); id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971).
20 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2211–14 (2016);
id. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–43 (2003); id. at 350
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies — And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635–37 (2006).
22 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 481–84 (2004).
23 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 5–6 (1982); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1782–84 (1994).
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Every case begins, by Article III hypothesis, as a narrow one between
adversaries.24 A legal claim socializes their enmity and, by submitting
it to public scrutiny, generalizes it as well. Forcing rights into prefabricated modules flattens litigants’ gazes and encourages them to tie each
other to the most pathological case. Because the rights-as-trumps frame
cannot accommodate conflicts of rights, it forces us to deny that our
opponents have them. When rights are trumps, they favor rhetoric over
judgment, simplicity over context, homogeneity over diversity. The
frame requires us to formulate constitutional politics as a battle between
those who are of constitutional concern and those who are not. It coarsens us, and by leaving us farther apart at the end of a dispute than we
were at the beginning, it diminishes us.25
It is sometimes said that a special, if not unique, feature of U.S. constitutional law is that it constitutes us, not just as a nation, but as a
people as well.26 Ours is not an ethno-national or religious project but
a political one, dedicated to the audacious idea that liberalism and pluralism are mutually constituted. Needless to say, it has not always been
so. The early history of the United States required reconciling an unprecedented commitment to liberty for and equality among whites with
an equally impressive commitment to chattel slavery for Africans and
their descendants and domination of indigenous people.27 The civil
rights movement coincided with a rights explosion that has challenged
the movement’s priority of place within the constitutional culture. The
paradigmatic rights conflict of the twenty-first century has involved
multiple principles that must be jointly maximized or else selectively
abandoned. Respect for the nation’s complexity requires that rights
recognition be a jurisgenerative rather than a jurispathic process. Our
rights culture cannot constitute us unless all rights count, and all rights
cannot count if all rights are absolute.
This Foreword charts a path forward. The claim that the rights-astrumps, or categorical, frame describes U.S. constitutional law will encounter resistance, and so Part II defines the terms of reference and
makes the positive case for fitting the Court’s jurisprudence into those
terms. The U.S. Supreme Court balances pervasively, and what categories it maintains are riddled with exceptions. What is distinctive
about the American position, and what aligns it with Dworkin, comes
into view only in comparison to the dominant alternative: proportionality. Categoricalism and proportionality reflect different orientations
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24
25

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14 (1991).
26 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 5 (2005).
27 See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 5–7 (2010); Patrick Wolfe,
Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 394 (2006).
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toward what Professors Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat describe as
the dyad of legal authority versus legal justification.28 Whether balancing is viewed as exceptional or instead as inherent in the task of rights
adjudication affects the constitutional imagination in ways that the
Term’s rights cases make vivid.
What follows from the U.S. approach to constitutional adjudication
forms the subject of Part III. Categorical adjudication is rule-like in its
orientation, and rules by their nature distort the underlying norm they
are designed to implement. The frame deprives constitutional decisionmakers of the resources necessary to adjudicate conflicts of rights,
as in abortion, affirmative action, or religious exemption cases, and obscures the constitutional dimension of governmental interests, which derive from a constitutionally protected right of political participation.
The benefit of rule-like decisional norms lies in the promise of transparency and predictability, but in a society in which rights claims are both
ubiquitous and reasonable, this benefit turns out to be elusive. We disagree — reasonably — about the rights that we have,29 and so a categorical frame burdens the categories with more pressure than they can
bear. The result is the worst of both worlds: a dogmatic but capricious
devotion to categorical rules.
To be sure, that this state of affairs is problematic does not mean
remedies avail themselves, but the Court’s approach is less autochthonous than we might suppose. Part IV corrects the common but misplaced view that conceiving of rights as trumps is some kind of
American birthright or is baked into U.S. constitutional arrangements.
It is true that the U.S. Constitution does not typically attach limitations
clauses to rights, but that fact neither explains the emergence of the U.S.
approach nor justifies its continuation. Proportionality analysis is more
congenial to the way the lawyers and statesmen of the Founding generation understood rights than the presumptive absolutism that characterizes the modern frame. That frame is rather an artifact of the second
half of the twentieth century, when U.S. constitutional lawyers constructed the categorical frame as a way of reconciling the post-Lochner30
regime of deference to government actors with the unique place of race
in the American constitutional order. Countries whose constitutional
courts lack the historical baggage and the inherited doctrinal architecture of the U.S. Supreme Court have structured their adjudicative
frameworks to match the fecundity of modern rights claims.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28 See MOSHE
TIONAL CULTURE

COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITU111–12 (2013); see also Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 31 (1994).
29 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1999).
30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Part V applies the Foreword’s insights to some of the Term’s First
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and partisan gerrymandering cases,
with special reference to the lessons of foreign experience in these areas.
The constitutional jurisprudence of other countries is of course peculiar
to their own histories, constitutional structures, and institutional
arrangements. But the considered views of foreign legal experts confronting similar problems and drawing on analogous conceptual frames
nonetheless have some power to persuade, if lacking power to control.31
The Court views freedom of speech as a classic trump, inviting a
good lawyer to formulate a state requirement to bake a cake for a samesex wedding,32 to pay union dues,33 to give women accurate information
about available health services,34 or even to engage in partisan gerrymandering as speech infringements.35 The tidiness of a speech frame
pulled the Court into the case, but Masterpiece Cakeshop was never really about freedom of expression. What made Phillips’s claim constitutionally interesting was not that he bakes especially awesome cakes but
rather that his motivation for refusing to make one for Craig and
Mullins was grounded in his religious beliefs. A “disparate impact” freedom of religion claim was off the table in the case because the Court —
fearing the need for balancing — had declared such claims to be beneath
constitutional concern.36 Other jurisdictions handle religious discrimination claims with subtler instruments.
Unlike the apparently absolute language of the First Amendment —
“Congress shall make no law”37 — the Fourth Amendment’s text seems
to invite an adjudicator precisely to evaluate the reasonableness of a
search at retail, on a case-by-case basis.38 And yet, because most
searches must be conducted pursuant to warrants supported by
probable cause, the weight of analysis in many Fourth Amendment
cases resembles an ontological inquiry into the nature of a search.39 The
resulting doctrinal Byzantium requires the Court’s constant care, as
rules built against the limits of human attention and cognition are jerry–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 71–72 (2010).
32 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018).
33 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2462 (2018).
34 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–70 (2018).
35 See Brief for Appellees at 36, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161); see also

Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934, 1937–38 (Kagan, J., concurring).
36 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–83 (1990). Phillips’s claim of intentional religious
discrimination remained in the case and eventually proved decisive. See Masterpiece Cakeshop,
138 S. Ct at 1730–31.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
(1994).
39 See id. at 762–85; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 358–60 (1974).
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rigged onto panoptic digital technology, omniscient DNA evidence, and
countless other unforeseen circumstances. Carpenter v. United States40
well illustrates the costs of sidelining reasonableness as the Fourth
Amendment’s über-value.
In partisan gerrymandering cases, the Court has searched in vain for
a categorical frame to save it from the social science needed to assess the
effects of a politically biased districting map.41 At oral argument, Chief
Justice Roberts referred to the statistical evidence offered to resolve such
cases as “sociological gobbledygook.”42 The rights-as-trumps frame
takes as a premise that judges are better suited to resolve interpretive
disagreement over the stylized content of the law rather than empirical
uncertainty about facts in the world. Along with the Court’s decision
upholding the President’s ban on travel from a set of mostly Muslimmajority countries,43 the gerrymandering cases show how the categorical frame’s fixation on policing the borders of political authority can
deny the protection of rights at just the point when protection is most
urgent.
More broadly, the partisan gerrymandering cases offer a poignant
example of what can be gained in reimagining the relationship between
constitutional law and constitutional politics. Professor William
Eskridge has identified “lowering the stakes of politics” as the overriding
end of judicial review within a pluralist democracy.44 A rights-astrumps frame makes hash of that goal, for it saps the losing side in
constitutional disputes of the leverage to deliberate toward political consensus. The states not only urged a hands-off approach to partisan
gerrymanders but also insisted that allowing the controlling political
party to insulate itself from political competition is uniquely consistent
with the judicial role.45
It is in fact quite the opposite. The best justification for judicial
review in a pluralist democracy with a mature rights culture is that
judges have the unique capacity to call partisans to the table, to enable
them to see the dignity in each other’s commitments. That trusty footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,46 especially as Professor
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40
41
42

138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-1161_mjn0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S9PW-2CBE].
43 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
44 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1293–94 (2005).
45 See Brief for Appellants at 39–40, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161); Brief of Amici Curiae
States of Michigan et al. in Support of Appellees at 3–8, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018)
(No. 17-333).
46 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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John Hart Ely famously envisioned it, sought to reserve judicial review
for instances in which the ordinary political process was unworthy of
trust.47 If the measure of such a politics is a systematic disregard of the
interests of, and a refusal to negotiate with, those not currently holding
power, then courts today should be very busy indeed.48
Rights are constantly at stake. And while we take rights seriously
enough, we do not do so reasonably enough. Therein lies the path to
rebuilding American politics, a feat that is, if I may, worthy of Hercules.
II. OUR ABSOLUTISM
The first task is to spell out what “rights as trumps” means, connect
this idea to categorical adjudication, and defend the claim that these
labels fit U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Section A begins inductively
by showing how the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicates a set of standard
rights claims. I use a series of cases to identify the core features of the
categorical approach: analysis is weighted toward threshold interpretive
questions rather than the application of law to fact, and so balancing is
notionally understood as exceptional rather than inherent. Section B
describes the features and the global ascendancy of proportionality analysis, the leading competitor to the categorical approach. Section C generalizes the conceptual differences between the two approaches, which
may be stated in terms of at least four different frames: rules and standards; universalism and particularism; interpretation and empiricism;
and legal authority and justification.
A. Taking Rights Reasonably
In 2000, Stephen Harper, the future Canadian Prime Minister who
was then president of a conservative lobbying group called the National
Citizens Coalition, challenged Canada’s campaign finance laws.49 Under section 350 of the Canada Elections Act,50 a third party could not
spend more than $150,000 overall or more than $3000 in a given electoral district in relation to a general election.51 Freedom of political
expression is a fundamental freedom under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,52 and so Harper claimed that section 350 and
related provisions violated the Charter.53
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47
48

See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75–77 (1980).
Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (“[If] all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”).
49 Harper v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.).
50 S.C. 2000, c 9 (Can.).
51 Id. § 350.
52 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
53 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 50.

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD

39

This claim would be perfectly intelligible under U.S. constitutional
law. It was the precise claim, differing only in the dollar amounts,
that doomed the expenditure limits set forth in the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 197454 in Buckley v. Valeo.55 A similar
claim as applied to corporations and unions drawing on their general
treasury funds doomed Title II of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act56 (BCRA) in Citizens United v. FEC.57
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Act, but the outcome is
less relevant for our purposes than the Court’s reasoning. The majority
held that the Act’s advertising restrictions infringed the right to political
expression, and indeed the government conceded the point.58 But the
Court found that the Act was nonetheless valid because it was “justified”
under section 1 of the Charter,59 through which certain freedoms are
guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”60
The Canadian Supreme Court implements this constitutional command by asking a series of questions first memorialized in the Court’s
decision in R. v. Oakes.61 The Court first discerns whether the law has
in view a “pressing and substantial” purpose, typically a deferential inquiry, and one that was satisfied in Harper by the goals of “promot[ing]
equality in political discourse,” “protect[ing] the integrity of the financing regime applicable to candidates and parties,” and “ensur[ing] that
voters have confidence in the electoral process.”62 The Oakes test continues with an inquiry into means-end fit: Is the government’s action
rationally related to that goal?63 In the case of section 350, the Court
concluded that advertising-expense limits were rationally connected to
the goal of preventing those with financial advantages from dominating
the electoral discourse.64 The third step is to ask whether the act is
necessary, in the sense of whether it minimally impairs the right.65 The
majority held that section 350 satisfied this step because the restriction
on third-party advertising was limited to a particular period before the
election and to messages that were associated with a candidate or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
424 U.S. 1, 6–7, 58 (1976) (per curiam).
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in 36 U.S.C. § 510 (2012) and scattered
sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2017)).
57 558 U.S. 310, 320–21, 365 (2010).
58 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 66.
59 Id. paras. 75, 121.
60 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
61 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138–39 (Can.).
62 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 92.
63 Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139.
64 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 104–09.
65 Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139.
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party.66 A final step, sometimes called balancing in the strict sense, is
to weigh the marginal impairment of the right against the marginal
benefit to the government to ensure that there is no gross disproportionality.67 Here, the Court held that the value of electoral fairness and
accessibility was sufficiently weighty to justify the impairment of third
parties’ ability to influence the election through spending.68
A comparison between Harper and its U.S. analogues in Buckley and
Citizens United illustrates the difference between a categorical inquiry
and proportionality analysis, of which the Oakes test is the canonical
global exemplar. First Amendment law in the United States rarely entails deciding whether the government is going too far in infringing on
what the Court concedes to be protected speech. Analysis of the merits
must await an answer to the antecedent question of what kind of speech
restriction is at issue. This inquiry is not qualitative, as in whether the
speech being regulated is of relatively low or high value, but is rather
categorical, and the categories are many. Is the government discriminating on the basis of viewpoint;69 or content;70 or speaker’s identity;71
or time, place, and manner?72 Is the government regulating expressive
conduct?73 Commercial speech?74 Is the speech occurring in a traditional public forum?75 A limited public forum?76 A nonpublic forum?77
Is the speaker the government?78 A government employee?79 If so, is
the speech on a matter of public concern?80 Is it false?81 Is it obscene?82
“Fighting words”?83 A “true threat”?84 Terrorism-related?85 The answers to these questions motivate a responsive standard of review that
calibrates how substantial or compelling the state interest must be and
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Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 112–14.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139–40.
Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 119–21.
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972).
See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802–03 (1989).
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.).
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966).
78 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015);
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010) (plurality opinion).
79 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
80 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983).
81 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731–35 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).
83 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
84 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
85 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010).
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how closely tailored to that interest the regulation must be to pass muster. Implicitly, the Court understands that regulation of speech is necessarily sensitive to context, but rather than assess the regulation in light
of its context directly, it disciplines the inquiry by placing it into one of
an ever-expanding set of boxes.
The Buckley opinion was accordingly less about whether a $1000
limit on individual campaign expenditures was a reasonable way of leveling influence over the political process (a question the Court never
entertained) than about whether such a limit was — in its essence — a
restriction on either “symbolic speech” or the “time, place, and manner”
of speech.86 Having decided that the limit fit neither box, the Court
placed it into the box of a content restriction, which therefore required
the strictest scrutiny.87 Once there, a good-government reform designed
in response to the Watergate scandal88 found itself surrounded by laws
of a very different character. The Court compared the expenditure limit
to laws requiring newspapers to give space to reply to critical editorial
content89 or criminalizing the publication of election-day advocacy.90
The Buckley Court took the cases invalidating such practices to stand
for the proposition, apparently applicable in Buckley itself, that “no test
of reasonableness can save [such] a state law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment.”91 It was not enough, it seems, simply
to decide that those statutes were unreasonable.
A quarter century after Buckley, in an effort to respond to perceived
imbalances in political financing exacerbated by the decision’s cleaving
of contribution limits from expenditure limits, Congress passed a law
prohibiting corporations and unions from spending general treasury
funds on independent advocacy in the run-up to a federal election.92
Corporations and unions could still spend money on electioneering, but
they had to do so through the artifice of a separate political action committee (PAC), or else more than two months before a general election or
one month before a primary.93
In 2007, an incorporated nonprofit called Citizens United wanted to
advertise and make available through video-on-demand Hillary:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15–21 (1976) (per curiam).
See id. at 44–45.
See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001,
1003 (1976).
89 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50–51; see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243
(1974).
90 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50–51; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
91 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added) (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 220).
92 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92
(2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. IV 2017)).
93 Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88–90 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104).
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The Movie, a takedown of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President.94 Writing for a 5–
4 majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that any speech restriction based
on the speaker’s identity (here, its status as a corporation or union) receives the highest level of judicial scrutiny,95 a categorical determination
that dramatically narrowed the justifications available to the government. The Court then efficiently dispensed with any suggestion that
restricting corporate electioneering speech funded through general treasury funds was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in avoiding
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, or in mitigating the fundraising and tax advantages conferred by use of the corporate form.96
Citizens United presented the Court with an unusual number of
grounds on which to avoid so blunt a holding. As noted, the Act did
not prohibit corporate speech but rather required that a small fraction
of such speech be funded through a separate PAC. In addition, the
Court had previously limited the definition of corporate electioneering
ads to those that are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”97 From
the outset, then, the field of regulation was far narrower than it might
be for other instances of speaker-based restrictions; the prospect of this
expenditure limit having a chilling effect on clearly protected speech was
dim.98 Hillary: The Movie, a feature-length film, was obviously more
than just an electioneering ad, and Citizens United was not a for-profit
or shell corporation but rather an ideological organization funded
primarily through individual contributions.99 It sought to release its
film through video-on-demand, a customized service that — unlike traditional television advertising — does not risk overwhelming a captive
audience with campaign propaganda.100
Any of these points could have proven decisive to a Court that
trained its analysis less on the threshold question of whether the legal
regime triggered strict scrutiny and more on downstream questions of
how burdensome that regime was in light of Citizens United’s particular
situation.101 Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested, for example, that the
government’s litigation position would support a ban on the printing of
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part).
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Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010).
See id. at 340–41, 364–65.
Id. at 351–56, 360–61.
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 402, 415–19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
See id. at 406–07.
Id. at 326 (majority opinion).
See id. at 404–05 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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books, a topic that dominated oral argument both times Citizens
United — a case about neither books nor a ban — was argued.102
It is tempting to attribute the differences between Harper and the
U.S. cases to ideological diversity. It is well documented that the United
States is a global outlier in its courts’ zeal for freedom of speech.103
Moreover, Citizens United was decided by a more conservative Court
than the one that reached contrary earlier decisions in Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce104 and McConnell v. FEC.105
Treating free speech as a trump might be the epiphenomenon rather
than the primary one, which is more banal and outcome oriented.
The U.S. approach to rights is eclectic, but it is nonetheless possible
to generalize beyond Buckley and Citizens United. Consider, briefly,
five areas of doctrine that further show the problem: antidiscrimination
law, social and economic rights, abortion, school integration, and the
Second Amendment.
1. Antidiscrimination Law. — The Supreme Court maintains that
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause require
a finding that the defendant specifically intended to discriminate on the
basis of a protected ground.106 The Court further maintains that its
most rigorous, least deferential, most skeptical form of analysis is triggered by any racial classification by the government, no matter the background history, minority status, or evident motivations of the groups or
actors involved.107 In disparate impact cases across both race and religion, and in affirmative action cases as well, the Court has defended its
formalistic approach explicitly on the ground that it could not otherwise
modulate its jurisprudence. That is, the Court has claimed that its approach was required because it could not otherwise adjudicate extreme
but hypothetical cases that were not then before the Court.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102 Transcript of Oral Argument passim (Sept. 9, 2009), Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08205), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-205[Reargued].
pdf [https://perma.cc/T6TP-2PZG]; Transcript of Oral Argument passim (Mar. 24, 2009), Citizens
United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2008/08-205.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6M-4CEF].
103 See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003).
104 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990) (upholding a state prohibition on spending corporate treasury
funds on independent expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for state office).
105 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding the majority of BCRA).
106 E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33 (1993)
(free exercise); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (same); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 271–72 (1979) (equal protection); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–46 (1976) (same).
107 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215–18, 226–27 (1995).
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Thus, in Washington v. Davis,108 in which the Court first declared
that an equal protection violation required a claimant to show intentional discrimination and not just disparate impact, Justice White wrote
for the majority:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome
to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.109

A decade later, the Court applied a similar principle again. In
McCleskey v. Kemp,110 it had to determine the constitutional relevance
of statistics showing that black defendants with white victims were
more likely to receive capital sentences than white defendants or defendants whose victims were not white.111 Writing for the Court, Justice
Powell registered his concern that an equality or Eighth Amendment
claim of this sort, “taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”112 “Thus,” the opinion continued, “if we accepted McCleskey’s
claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing
decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty.”113 The assumption that such claims are — like claims of an
indirectly discriminatory tax or welfare statute — judicially unmanageable reflects a predisposition against balancing and in favor of rights as
trumps.114
The Court has adopted the same posture in religious discrimination
cases. Employment Division v. Smith115 presented the Court with the
question of whether members of an indigenous tribe for whom sacramental peyote use held religious significance could be denied unemployment compensation after being fired for violating company drug
policy.116 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the claim
on the ground that a neutral and generally applicable law — here, the
state’s criminal law outlawing peyote — does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause just because it disproportionately burdens a religious
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426 U.S. 229.
Id. at 248.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Id. at 286–87.
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 315.
See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094,
3172–79 (2015).
115 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
116 Id. at 874.
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practice in some of its applications.117 Justice Scalia assumed that constitutional recognition of burdens of that sort would require a demanding “compelling interest” test that would potentially require “religious
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”118
Rather than needing to rule on claims for exemption from military service and tax payments and manslaughter laws and compulsory vaccination and traffic laws and minimum wage laws and child neglect and
animal cruelty laws and environmental protection and antidiscrimination laws — all of which Justice Scalia’s opinion carefully enumerated — it is better, he said, that the Court cut off these claims at the
root.119 It would otherwise be “courting anarchy.”120
Equating disparate impact regimes with a lawless dystopia where all
is permitted — dogs and cats living together and the like — ignores
strategies of claim management that have proven resilient in the context
of adjudication under numerous antidiscrimination statutes that
broaden liability beyond the constitutional baseline. Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,121 a showing that an employment practice has a
disparate impact on members of a protected class shifts the burden to
the employer to show not a “compelling interest” but rather that the
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.122 That
standard codifies the case law as the Court had developed it prior to its
outlying decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.123 What counts
as disparate impact in the first place is not left to caprice but generally
follows the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 1978 rule of
thumb: “A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate.”124
Similarly directive but flexible doctrinal heuristics have developed
under disparate impact statutes passed in the areas of voting rights and
religious exercise. The Voting Rights Act,125 as amended in 1982, does
not subject claims of racial vote dilution to an intent requirement,126 but
since 1986 the Court has combined a threshold analysis to identify the
conditions under which racial vote dilution is theoretically possible with
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Id. at 878–80, 882.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 888.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
122 Id. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (amending § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding
§ 703(k) regarding the burden of proof in disparate impact cases); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
123 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (increasing the burden on plaintiffs bringing disparate impact cases),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
124 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2017).
125 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
126 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016).
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a totality of the circumstances test to find ultimate liability.127 And just
as the “strict” scrutiny for disparate impact religious claims was rather
famously muted and case specific prior to Smith,128 case law under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act129 (RFRA) has courted no anarchy
to date. To wit, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,130 several religiously motivated employers sought exemptions from a Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) requirement, implementing the
Affordable Care Act,131 that they provide their employees with health
insurance plans that included birth control coverage.132 Justice
Kennedy’s decisive concurring opinion refused to reduce the statute to
any generalizable, rule-like accommodation requirement but instead
noted that in the case itself, the government had simply not shown that
it was unable to both meet the employer’s wishes and provide its employees with birth control coverage within HHS’s existing accommodation framework.133 The case was decided on its facts.134
Categorical constitutional analysis also of course motivates the
Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework, wherein the nature of the protected
classification determines the Court’s standard of review. Under the
black letter rules, race gets strict scrutiny, gender intermediate scrutiny,
and most other classifications rational basis review, under which any
rational justification in support of a legitimate state objective suffices to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even if the justification is entirely
hypothetical.135
Matters are considerably more complicated, however, than this
hornbook sketch allows. Strict scrutiny in cases in which the state is
reinforcing social hierarchy does not look quite like strict scrutiny in
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See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1306–08 (2007)
(arguing that because before Smith any substantial burden on religion triggered strict scrutiny, the
test was “little more than a balancing test,” id. at 1308); William P. Marshall, Solving the Free
Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 548–53 (1983) (criticizing
the Court’s inconsistent approach to religious exemptions pre-Smith). Compare Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963) (holding that South Carolina could not withhold unemployment benefits from a Seventh-day Adventist on the basis of her religiously grounded refusal to work on
Saturdays), with Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606–07 (1961) (plurality opinion) (upholding
Pennsylvania’s Sunday-closing law despite its disparate impact on shopkeepers who observe a
Saturday sabbath).
129 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(2012)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
130 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
131 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
132 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
133 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 2759–60 (majority opinion).
135 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
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cases in which it seeks to combat that hierarchy.136 Some groups whose
defining characteristics are said to trigger rational basis review — the
children of undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, the disabled — have at times seemed to benefit from more rigorous scrutiny of
the government’s motives and methods.137 Departures from the framework are invariably exposed in dissenting or concurring opinions, often
with little or no rebuttal from the majority.138
The Justices have not been forthcoming about their obvious inclinations to moderate strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases or beef up
rational basis review in other discrimination cases involving important
social categories, but they have been forthright about their reasons for
caution. In his controlling opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,139 Justice Powell saw no “principled” basis on
which to distinguish which minority groups should and should not receive the benefit of heightened scrutiny: “Not all of these groups can
receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of
distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality,” he wrote, “for then
the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants.”140 Likewise, in determining that rational basis review
would continue to be the standard for claims of discrimination against
the intellectually disabled, Justice White worried openly that if the
Court applied a higher standard, it would face the difficult task of finding “a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, . . . [such
as] the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.”141 Notably,
the Court went on to invalidate the zoning ordinance at issue in the case,
signaling that rational basis review need not entail abdication of judicial
review.142 In doing so, the Court undermined the legal clarity it had
sought to preserve in declining to apply heightened scrutiny.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
136 Compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984) (striking down a judgment denying a
white mother custody of her infant because she had remarried a black man), with Fisher II, 136 S.
Ct. 2198, 2214–15 (2016) (upholding the University of Texas’s race-based affirmative action policy).
137 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227–30 (1982) (holding that Texas lacked a sufficient
rational basis to deny free public education to undocumented immigrant children); Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (finding no rational basis for amendment to state’s constitution that
would deny gays and lesbians the protection of antidiscrimination laws); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448–50 (1985) (finding no rational basis for permit requirement imposed upon a home for people with intellectual disabilities).
138 See, e.g., Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2238 (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
380 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559–62 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–41, 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
140 Id. at 295–96 (opinion of Powell, J.).
141 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445–46.
142 See id. at 446–47, 450.

48

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:28

2. Social and Economic Rights. — With limited exceptions,143 the

Court has not allowed claims sounding in social and economic rights to
get off the ground. That reluctance follows directly from understanding
rights as trumps. Social and economic rights claims imply affirmative
duties on the part of the government. Such duties must always compete
with other governmental imperatives and financial constraints, and so
they cannot be absolute. Thus, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights144 obligates states to “take
steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights” the covenant
protects.145 “Progressive realization” has also been an influential and
much-discussed remedial standard for social and economic rights protected under national constitutions.146
The possibility that the positive obligations that paradigmatically attach to social and economic rights might be both justiciable and susceptible to moderating constructs such as progressive realization seems to
have escaped the Court’s recognition. All such rights claims receive
minimum scrutiny, largely out of concern that the Court is incapable of
making contextual judgments or engaging in balancing. When, in
Dandridge v. Williams,147 the Court denied that Maryland was constitutionally obliged to calibrate welfare payments to family size, it refused
to distinguish between cases involving “regulation of business or industry” and those involving “the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings.”148 The most deferential form of review was
deemed appropriate in either kind of case, notwithstanding what the
Court itself described as a “dramatically real factual difference” between
the two cases.149
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 in
which the Court rejected the notion of a fundamental right to education,
Justice Powell wondered how education could be “distinguished from
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
143 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621–22 (1969) (invalidating residency requirements
for welfare assistance); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (invalidating poll
taxes); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (requiring appellate counsel for indigent
criminal defendants); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (requiring trial counsel for
indigent criminal defendants); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (invalidating fee for trial
transcript).
144 Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
145 Id. art. 2(1).
146 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, § 26(2) (housing); id. § 27(2) (health care, food, water,
and social security); see also KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS 101–04 (2012).
147 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
148 Id. at 485.
149 Id.
150 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter,”151 which had already been held to be outside constitutional protection in cases such as Dandridge. As with welfare rights, the Court’s
argument was not grounded in the substantive value these rights might
hold for the rights-bearer or for society.152 The problem, rather, was the
perceived absence of any judicial capacity for translating obvious factual distinctions into a manageable adjudicative standard.
In a related vein, the Court insists that, in the usual case, constitutional rights apply only against state actors.153 The language of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments supports that limitation,154 but the text
would be little more than a pleading constraint were the Court to entertain the notion that some rights require affirmative state action to be
realized. Claims against private actors could be reformulated as claims
of the government’s duty to protect or to supervise. In Deshaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,155 Joshua
DeShaney’s unsuccessful argument was, in substance, that he had a
right not to be beaten senseless by his father, though it was styled as a
duty on the part of state social workers to protect him.156 In Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,157 Jessica Gonzales would have had less need
of a constitutional claim against her estranged husband for murdering
their three children if she had won her substantive due process claim
against the police for failure to enforce a restraining order against
him.158 Notably, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
later found the United States liable for the state’s failure to protect the
Gonzales children,159 relying on the European Court of Human Rights’s
understanding of such a duty in progressive terms, as a question “of
reasonable means, and not results.”160 Rigid application of the state
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Several influential theories of human rights, not to mention widely shared moral intuitions,
understand these entitlements to be at least as valuable to human flourishing as basic civil and
political rights. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term — Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 13–16 (1969); Martha
Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 203, 208–26 (R.
Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990); Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 30, 31–42 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory
of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 334–36, 345–48 (2004).
153 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–21 (2000); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 195–97 (1989); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
154 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
155 489 U.S. 189.
156 Id. at 193.
157 545 U.S. 748.
158 Id. at 751.
159 Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11, ¶ 199 (2011).
160 Id. ¶ 134.
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action doctrine is as much a matter of the categorical frame as it is a
matter of any textual hook.
3. Abortion. — It is not difficult to describe abortion conflicts as
implicating competing rights: that of the woman to autonomy over her
body and that of the fetus to life. Abortion rights further implicate the
equality of women, whose lives are uniquely disrupted by the physical,
social, and economic demands of motherhood.161 The reigning approach to disparate impact cases obscures the equality dimension of
abortion rights,162 and the categorical frame impedes the Court from
recognizing the state’s interest in fetal life as sounding in rights. Justice
Blackmun’s Roe v. Wade163 majority opinion said as much. He wrote
that a fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that a contrary decision would mean that regulation
of abortion was constitutionally required.164 For Justice Blackmun, the
threshold question of fetal personhood acted as a constitutional on/off
switch: if a fetus is a person, all abortion must be forbidden; if not,
abortion on request must, to a point, be permitted.165
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey166 is less categorical than Roe — famously so —
and goes some way toward acknowledging, at least rhetorically, the reasonable disagreement that sits at the heart of abortion politics.167 Still,
Casey lacks the resources either to recognize the rights dimension of the
state’s position or to more fully recognize the equality dimension of the
woman’s. One of Casey’s innovations was to permit the state to pursue
an interest in the potential life of the fetus from the moment of conception and not just in the third trimester.168 In doing so, the joint opinion
repudiated the Roe Court’s suggestion that first- and second-trimester
abortion restrictions must be directed solely at the preservation of the
woman’s health.169 At the same time, the Court shied away from itself
treating fetal life as a matter of moral or constitutional significance. For
the Casey joint opinion, fetal life is simply an important and legitimate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
161 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927–28 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382–
83 (1985).
162 See Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223, 1274–80 (2009).
163 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164 Id. at 156–58.
165 See id. at 156–57, 162–63.
166 505 U.S. 833.
167 See id. at 872 (plurality opinion); see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 428–30 (2007).
168 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–75 (plurality opinion).
169 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65; Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–75 (plurality opinion).
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interest the state might (or might not) pursue,170 no different analytically
from its interest in, say, diverse broadcast television programming.171
As much as the joint opinion fails to express the full weight of the
state’s interest in fetal life, it fails also to express the full weight of the
woman’s interest in equality. Abortion restrictions of course affect men,
but we can be confident that no state has ever required a man to bear
or beget a child. It cannot escape notice, moreover, that society places
different demands of support and responsibility on mothers than on fathers, a phenomenon supported by, but only marginally accounted for
by, the physiology of pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation.172 Constitutional equality law fails to recognize the additional burdens that abortion restrictions place on women inasmuch as such burdens result not
from a woman’s sex alone but from her status as a woman seeking an
abortion.173 It is accordingly a “disparate impact” claim that, thanks to
the categorical nature of such inquiries, receives rational basis review
regardless of how burdensome it is.
4. School Integration. — The binary, categorical nature of the U.S.
frame has been a subject of self-reflection in school integration cases.
The Court’s remedial commitment in the wake of Brown v. Board of
Education174 focused on school systems whose racial mixture had resulted from de jure rather than simply de facto segregation.175 It remains the case that systems whose segregated schools are notionally attributable to the decisions of private individuals or institutions are of no
constitutional moment; indeed, the Court’s decision in Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1176 suggested that
the state is presumptively forbidden from taking race into account in
order to remedy segregation of this sort.177 By stark contrast, it also
remains the case that trial courts that find de jure racial segregation of
public schools are empowered to put in place and enforce the most coercive remedies known to constitutional law: busing of children across
county lines and retaining jurisdiction over local educational decisions
for decades.
The distortion this binary has visited upon desegregation efforts was
becoming increasingly clear into the 1970s. In a case out of Charlotte–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
170
171

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–75.
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled on other grounds by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
172 See Ginsburg, supra note 161, at 382–83.
173 Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974) (employing rational basis review in upholding the exclusion of pregnancy coverage from a state disability insurance program).
174 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
175 See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211–13 (1973).
176 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
177 See id. at 747–48 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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Mecklenburg County in North Carolina, the Court unanimously approved a district court–ordered busing plan, premised on a history of de
jure segregation, between the mostly black areas of central Charlotte
and the mostly white outlying suburbs.178 In distinction to other southern jurisdictions that had been required to take affirmative steps to integrate their schools,179 Charlotte-Mecklenburg was a large urban
county whose existing patterns of racial segregation were caused largely
by nominally private housing decisions and government policies that
did not relate specifically to public schools.180 Racial segregation in
Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools resembled segregation in many northern
jurisdictions that did not have state policies requiring or permitting segregated schools.181 The de jure/de facto regime therefore mandated radically different treatment for jurisdictions that were, arguably, similar in
relevant ways.
Two years after the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, faced with a northern school district in Denver,182 Justice Powell proposed to Justice
Brennan a compromise, the essential terms of which are described in his
concurring opinion: eliminate the de jure/de facto distinction and impose
a nationwide standard that obligates public authorities not to bus students to individual schools but rather to operate a “genuinely integrated
school system.”183 Justice Brennan rejected Justice Powell’s overture.184
Whatever we think of that move strategically or politically, it perpetuated a system whereby courts are disempowered from addressing school
segregation without making an antecedent and increasingly difficult factual finding of de jure segregation. Those jurisdictions that have failed
to achieve unitary status are selectively ostracized for decisions made by
their predecessors even as their school systems are demographically similar to others that escape public and judicial attention.
5. Second Amendment. — Even without its conspicuous reference
to a “well regulated” militia,185 it would be obvious that the Second
Amendment does not and cannot support an unqualified right of individual Americans to keep and bear arms. Restrictions on who may bear
weapons, of what types, and where cannot, ipso facto, violate the constitution of a functioning society. Marrying that reality to the rights-astrumps frame has produced considerable confusion.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22–32 (1971).
See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441–42 (1968); Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S.
218, 233–34 (1964).
180 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 222–23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the basis of the holding in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1).
181 See id.
182 Id. at 191 (majority opinion).
183 Id. at 223–25 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 303–04 (1994).
185 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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For decades, the constitutional common sense was that the Second
Amendment did not protect individual gun rights but only the right of
a state to keep an armed militia or, at best, the right of an individual to
bear arms for the purpose of militia service. As Justice McReynolds
wrote in the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,186 the Amendment
must be interpreted in view of its “obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness” of the militia.187 In 1968,
after the New Jersey Supreme Court relied upon the “collective right”
view to uphold a state law imposing certain permitting, identification,
and fitness requirements on gun purchasers,188 the U.S. Supreme Court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal “for want of a substantial federal question.”189 In 1980 the Court applied rational basis review to provisions
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968190 that forbade convicted felons from possessing firearms, reasoning that the Act
did not “trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.”191
The upshot of the “collective rights” or “individual militia rights”
view of the Second Amendment would be to make the right a nonstarter
in the modern world, essentially inaccessible to present-day citizens.192
Thus, the former Solicitor General and Harvard Law School Dean
Erwin Griswold wrote in a 1990 op-ed titled “Phantom Second
Amendment ‘Rights’” that the proposition that the Second Amendment
poses “no barrier to strong gun laws is perhaps the most well-settled
proposition in American constitutional law.”193 Former Chief Justice
Burger later said the Amendment “doesn’t guarantee the right to have
firearms at all”194 and called the argument “one of the greatest pieces of
fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen.”195
Whatever the pedigree of this view of the Second Amendment, its
prominence has helped distort the debate over the Amendment’s reach.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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307 U.S. 174 (1939).
Id. at 178.
Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526–29, 531 (N.J. 1968).
Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812, 812 (1969) (per curiam).
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
See H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO
ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 11–12 (2002); Carl T. Bogus, The
Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 408 (1998); Calvin Massey,
Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2000).
193 Erwin N. Griswold, Phantom Second Amendment “Rights,” WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 1990),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/11/04/phantom-second-amendmentrights/f4381818-fed9-4e63-8d62-f62056818181/ [https://perma.cc/36AK-REW3].
194 David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359,
1367 n.9 (quoting Warren Burger, Press Conference Concerning Introduction of the Public Health
and Safety Act of 1992, FED. NEWS SERV., June 26, 1992).
195 The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast Dec. 16, 1991).
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Proponents of constitutional gun rights devoted tremendous energy to
rebutting the collective rights position and relatively little energy to discussing standards of review or what regulations would or should survive
scrutiny under the individual rights position.196 Many on both sides of
the constitutional question have appeared to assume that the individual
rights view would require strict scrutiny or some analogously exacting
standard.197 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller198 opens with fifty pages excavating the “meaning” of the Second
Amendment,199 followed by three paragraphs discussing potential exceptions to the individual right announced.200 The basis for those exceptions — laws restricting possession of firearms by convicted felons or
the mentally ill, forbidding the bearing of arms “in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings,”201 and restrictions on gun
sales202 — is left unexplained in the opinion. The opinion treats the
scope and substance of gun rights as an interpretive question to be determined by legalistic sources such as original meaning and precedent,203
not as an empirical question subject to qualitative analysis or a weighing
of costs and benefits.
That focus is even more explicit in the Heller majority’s brief discussion of the D.C. handgun ban itself. The Court rejected Justice Breyer’s
suggestion, discussed below, that the right to bear arms might be subject
to the state’s ordinary police powers:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection
has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The
very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government — even
the Third Branch of Government — the power to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. . . . We would not apply an “interest-balancing”
approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie.
The Second Amendment is no different.204

This remarkable passage reveals an ideology of rights absolutism
that this Part has argued is broadly shared at the Court. It perpetuates
the myth that interest balancing is never conducted, notwithstanding
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
196 See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 685–87
(2007); see also Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service
in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237 (2004) (book review).
197 See Winkler, supra note 196, at 690–92.
198 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
199 Id. at 576–626.
200 Id. at 626–28.
201 Id. at 626.
202 Id. at 626–27.
203 See id. at 626 (suggesting that “exhaustive historical analysis” should determine the reach of
the Second Amendment).
204 Id. at 634–35 (citation omitted).
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its use, for example, in cases involving the Contracts Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Takings Clause.205 Its suggestion that the enumeration of a right is inherently inconsistent with interest balancing or
case-by-case adjudication could have been written by Dworkin himself,
as Part III develops further. Finally, the Court compared the Second
Amendment to its next-door neighbor the First Amendment. By seeking
refuge in a category of rights the Court has already deemed sacred, the
Heller opinion reinforces the view that sacredness is in the nature of
rights themselves.
Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found
favor with Justice Breyer. Nearly two decades ago, concurring in Nixon
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,206 he wrote that “where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation,” a
balancing of interests rather than “a strong presumption against constitutionality” is appropriate.207 In his recent book, The Court and the
World, Justice Breyer describes the appeal of proportionality as lying in
the transparency it brings to balancing, which is implicit within but disclaimed by proponents of the categorical approach.208
It is not surprising, then, that Justice Breyer saw in Heller an opportunity to promote an alternative to the ideology of rights absolutism.
Rather than linger on the threshold question of the “meaning” of the
right the Second Amendment protects, as both the majority and Justice
Stevens’s dissent did,209 he placed the weight of his analysis on what the
government may do in virtue of the presence of an individual right to
bear arms and in light of the state’s persistent and legitimate interest in
public safety.210 In justifying that approach, Justice Breyer referred specifically to proportionality as desirable in a case in which “important
interests lie on both sides of the constitutional equation.”211 In that context, rights cannot coherently be deemed even presumptively absolute.
The Court’s role is not to assess their application in the abstract but
rather to assess, at a remove, “whether the statute burdens a protected
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s
salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”212 This
assessment is largely empirical in nature, and one in which the legislature’s factfinding expertise is owed a degree of deference.213
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
205 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334–35 (1976); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
206 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding state limits on contributions to political candidates).
207 Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730–31
(2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
208 STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 257 (2015).
209 Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–626; id. at 640–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 See id. at 681–87 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 689.
212 Id. at 689–90 (citing Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
213 See id. at 690.
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* * *
The examples sketched above show the vitality of the categorical
frame within American constitutional law. At least four generalizable
elements are apparent. First, the Court resorts casually to slippery slope,
hypothetical arguments to silence claims made in the here and now, as
in disparate impact and positive rights cases. Second, the Court
struggles to reconcile potential rights conflicts with existing doctrinal
architecture, as in the abortion area. Third, the Court maintains thin
heuristics to temper its entry into complex social problems, as in the
school integration context. Finally, the Court adopts a romantic vision
of doctrinal simplicity and coherence, as in Heller.
A rights-as-trumps ideology does not cause these features of U.S.
constitutional law, at least not uniquely. They are overdetermined
within the cases discussed, all of which implicate rich and unruly social
conflicts that constitutional law could not fully discipline even if we
wanted it to. The point, though, is that a rights-as-trumps ideology
makes these doctrinal moves necessary. To the degree these features of
U.S. constitutional law are a problem, which Part III addresses directly,
the U.S. approach denies courts the resources to be part of the solution.
The following section fleshes out what an alternative vision of rights
looks like outside our borders, where it has become dominant.
B. Proportionality
In the city of Mönchengladbach in the West German State of North
Rhine-Westphalia, a woman wanted to feed pigeons in a public
square.214 A local ordinance forbade her from doing so, and so
she raised a constitutional challenge.215 Specifically, she argued that
denying her the right to feed pigeons implicated her right to “free development of [her] personality,” which the German Basic Law protects.216
Like substantive due process in the United States, the right to personality provides some residual protection for liberty interests that implicate
human dignity but that other provisions of the Basic Law do not specifically cover, including freedom of action in recreational and economic
spheres.217
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
214 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 23, 1980, 54
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 143 (Ger.), http://
www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv054143.html [https://perma.cc/XQ6Q-6WMR] (translation on file with
the Harvard Law Library).
215 Id. ¶¶ 2(b), 2(d).
216 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 2(1), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/32EU-UC9M] (Ger.).
217 See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 399–400 (3d ed. 2012).
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Faced with this claim, the Federal Constitutional Court conceded,
without analysis, that the right to free development of one’s personality
“includes the feeding of pigeons on streets and in public places as an
expression of love of animals.”218 The fact that the applicant had a right
to feed pigeons did not, however, require the government to articulate a
“compelling interest” or a “narrowly tailored” policy in support of limiting that right. For the German court, the right to feed pigeons does not
implicate the “sacrosanct” (unantastbare) area of private life; as such,
“everyone as a citizen who relates and is bound to a community must
accept government measures executed in the prevailing interest of the
community as a whole while strictly complying with the principle of
proportionality.”219 Accordingly, it was sufficient for the court to note
that feral pigeons gathered in flocks can cause significant property damage and that banning their feeding on public streets or in public facilities
was a “very limited interference with the freedom to exercise the love of
animals.”220 The court added that this measure was the mildest way to
achieve the desired public benefit and suggested that the ban may have
already led to a migration of pigeons to other areas.221
The Pigeon-Feeding Case has come in for serious criticism, even ridicule.222 I do not use it as an advertisement for proportionality, which
is far from perfect.223 The case is useful, rather, as a contrast dye that
helps to illuminate the significant framing difference between this style
of analysis and what Americans are familiar with. A U.S. court would
likely place the weight of its analysis on a question that gave the German
Constitutional Court no pause: whether the Constitution protects even
a prima facie right to feed pigeons. A claim of this sort would likely be
pleaded under the rubric of substantive due process, which would require a showing that the feeding of pigeons implicated a “fundamental”
right, one involving “personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy”224 or “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”225 or
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”226 A court unwilling to place the right to education within this august category is most
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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54 BVERFGE 143 ¶ 2(d).
Id. (“[M]uß jedermann als gemeinschaftsbezogener und gemeinschaftsgebundener Bürger
staatliche Maßnahmen hinnehmen, die im überwiegenden Interesse der Allgemeinheit unter strikter
Wahrung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgebotes erfolgen.” (citation omitted)).
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See, e.g., András Sajó, Abuse of Fundamental Rights or the Difficulties of Purposiveness, in
ABUSE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 30, 50–51 (András Sajó ed., 2006).
223 See infra section III.E, pp. 85–96.
224 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015).
225 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (citing Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).
226 Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
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unlikely to be in the bag for pigeon feeders.227 Without a right to cling
to, the claimant could win only if there was no conceivable rational basis
for the pigeon-feeding law,228 a standard that is at least notionally quite
distant from “strictly complying with the principle of proportionality,”
which the German court said was required.229
The Pigeon-Feeding Case thus models a contrasting vision that
places the weight of analysis and attendant scrutiny on the nature of the
government’s interest in and justification for limiting the right rather
than on the essence, provenance, and scope of the right at stake. As
Professor Kai Möller observes, many proportionality regimes feature
what has been called “rights inflation,” or “the increasing protection of
relatively trivial interests as (prima facie) rights.”230 A certain promiscuity in declaring rights to exist is accompanied by a certain austerity in
elevating interference with rights into violations of them.231
Proportionality seeks to achieve this calibration through a structured
approach to limitations on rights,232 in the style of the Canadian
Supreme Court’s opinion in Oakes. It is not just another word for “balancing,” and indeed there are proponents of proportionality who believe
balancing as such should play at most a limited role.233 Proportionality
is better understood as a transsubstantive analytic frame, a kind of intermediate scrutiny for all,234 that is designed to discipline the process
of rights adjudication on the assumption that rights are both important
and, in a democratic society, limitable.
Some form of proportionality is practiced in courts throughout the
world, such that even some of its critics have called it “the jus cogens of
human rights law.”235 It is ubiquitous within the domestic constitutional
courts of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and the
European Court of Justice.236 It is, as noted, the Canadian Supreme
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DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 296, 298 (2012); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 74, 139–52 (2008).
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Court’s default mode of analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.237 The last decade has seen a convergence on the use of
proportionality in Latin American courts, including especially in the influential jurisdictions of Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico.238 It is the basic
approach in the courts of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Malaysia.239 It is a standard tool of adjudication in South Africa and in
Israel.240 Even in Australia, whose constitution has no bill of rights and
which has a long history of interpretive “legalism,”241 the high court has
applied proportionality analysis in limiting the implied right to freedom
of political communication.242
Typical proportionality formulations comprise either three or four
ordered steps in the analysis: (1) some discernment of the nature of the
claimed right; (2) an assessment of the means-ends fit between the law
or act and some legitimate governmental objective; (3) a “leastrestrictive means” or “minimal impairment” test that asks whether the
government has less rights-impairing alternatives it could have pursued;
and (4) balancing in the strict sense, which requires the adjudicator to
assess whether there is significant disproportionality between the marginal benefit to the government and the marginal cost to the rightsbearer.243 Different jurisdictions place different weights on the various
steps in the analysis,244 and, in the nature of things, proportionality analysis, while notionally transsubstantive, can take different shape for different kinds of rights.245
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C. A Broader View
A commitment to proportionality does not suppose a commitment to
any particular model or formulation, such as Canada’s Oakes test.246
For the purposes of this Foreword, it is useful simply to identify the
relative positions of the categorical approach and proportionality within
some of the conceptual frames that have been applied to the structure
of legal norms. This section identifies four such frames: rules and standards; universalism and particularism; interpretation and empiricism;
and authority and justification. Each frame can accommodate a spectrum of approaches, some of which may combine elements of proportionality and categorical adjudication. The plea of this Foreword will
be to move U.S. constitutional adjudication closer than it is now to the
proportionality end of those frames.
1. Rules and Standards. — The distinction between rules and standards or, alternatively, rules and principles, is familiar in the law, and is
the dichotomy to which the categorical/proportionality binary most obviously corresponds.247 Legal norms formulated as rules identify legally
relevant facts ex ante and direct responsive legal conclusions.248
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks describe a “rule” as “a legal
direction which requires for its application nothing more than the determination of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental
events — that is, determinations of fact.”249 The categorical approach
is rule-like insofar as it identifies the facts relevant to placing a rights
dispute into a particular category (the various tiers of scrutiny, paradigmatically), and the result largely follows from that initial identification.
Legal norms formulated as standards (or principles) identify a set of
purposes or values and rely on downstream decisionmakers to conform
the law to those purposes or values. Hart and Sacks write that a standard is “a legal direction which can be applied only by making, in addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular
situation, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their
probable consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general
human experience.”250 Proportionality retains some rule-like elements,
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246 See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7
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but its affinity to standards results from its essential injunction that adjudicators make qualitative judgments about the law’s requirements in
light of competing values and social facts.251
The German political theorist Robert Alexy has been influential in
suggesting that proportionality is necessary to adjudication of legal
norms that take the form of principles. He is most focused on the rights
to liberty, equality, and dignity protected by the German Basic Law,252
but his work has been influential outside Germany both because of its
cogency and because many constitutional systems, including the U.S.
system, protect rights that appear to share this structure. Alexy’s core
insight is that while rules are norms that must either be fulfilled or not
fulfilled, principles are best understood as “optimization requirements,”
that is, “norms which require that something be realized to the greatest
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities.”253 Those possibilities are determined both by empirical reality and by other rules and
principles that mutually constitute the legal system. Because principles
“lack the resources to determine their own extent in light of competing
principles and what is factually possible,”254 principles must, inherently,
be subject to weighing. It is possible to optimize a principle even without vindicating it in a particular case, so long as the policy embraced by
the competing principle is suitable, necessary (as in not gratuitously burdensome), and pursued proportionately.255
On this view, understanding rights purely as rules would sever their
link to proportionality, and so Alexy’s intervention requires a premise
that some will contest. I am sympathetic to Alexy’s framework and to
its application to the U.S. Constitution: most of the rights Americans
care about are grounded in norms best described as standards or principles. Still, as Part III explores more fully, this Foreword’s call for
proportionality in the United States does not depend on ascribing a particular ontology to the Constitution’s rights provisions.
2. Universalism and Particularism. — Academics tend to be especially prone to distinguishing “splitters” from “lumpers.” Splitters, the
historian Jack Hexter observes, “like to point out divergences, to perceive differences, to draw distinctions.”256 By contrast, “[i]nstead of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
251 See Frederick Schauer, Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and the United States:
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trans., 2002).
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noting differences, lumpers note likenesses; instead of separateness, connection.”257 Lumpers are universalists. They search for systems that
can be constructed out of the mess of observable norms. Splitters are
particularists. More comfortable with a multiplicity of systems, or with
a highly variegated single system, they are apt to draw distinctions and
emphasize difference.
Universalism is often associated with the rule of law,258 which requires the law to be general, transparent, and free from exceptions, the
same qualities that characterize rule-based decisionmaking.259 The categorical approach to adjudication seeks to homogenize the law in just
this way and thereby both to streamline and to regularize the administration of justice. Universalism in constitutional adjudication tends to
emphasize the law’s major premises260: restrictions on speech are dangerous; racial discrimination is wrong; the state may (or, depending on
one’s view, may not) enact morals legislation. It tends to overlook potential variation within the law’s minor premises: not all speech is
equally valuable; not all racial discrimination is morally equivalent; not
all morals legislation is equally burdensome or justifiable. Conflicts of
rights present special problems for universalists because the major and
minor premises are indistinguishable a priori.261
Particularism places great weight on whether the law’s minor premises can complete the syllogism. The danger, of course, is that too much
contextualism can undermine the major premise, and adjudicators and
legislators might not know enough to draw the necessary distinctions.
Universalists prefer heuristics that reduce the error costs involved in
permitting adjudicators to assess directly the fit between the law’s overarching values and particular conflicts. Particularists are more confident in the adjudicator’s ability to perform that assessment than they
are in the law’s ability to develop a reliable heuristic. For the particularist, the Constitution’s substantive norms cannot be realized without
significant specificity in their application. Slippery slopes are standard
rhetorical tropes for universalists. For the particularist, the slippery
slope is not a problem “while this Court sits.”262
3. Interpretation and Empiricism. — The rights-as-trumps position
frames rights adjudication as predominantly an interpretive exercise.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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The Constitution contains rights, and the question for the Court is what
those rights mean, both at their core and at their margins. Courts may
excavate that meaning using the traditional tools of constitutional analysis: text, history, structure, precedent, and prudential considerations.263
Those tools are used to mine the historical and precedential markers —
determined in advance of the particular controversy — that will instruct
the adjudicator as to the correct outcome. In light of this frame, it is
not surprising that debates over the right way to conduct constitutional
analysis in these terms have dominated U.S. constitutional discourse for
several decades, and without interruption since the rights explosion that
began under the Warren Court.264
Proportionality frames rights adjudication as predominantly an empirical exercise. The question for the adjudicator is not primarily what
the rights in the Constitution “mean.” Rather, in light of rights inflation,
the question is whether the facts of the particular dispute form a sufficient basis for the government to have acted as it did. Is it responding
to a genuine and cognizable problem? Is it doing so through genuinely
responsive instruments? Are there other instruments available that
would be less burdensome to rights-holders? Is the benefit to be gained
out of proportion to the harm inflicted? Answering these questions does
not require extensive analysis of constitutional text, history, or precedent. Rather, it requires reliable access to social facts.265
None of the above is to suggest that proportionality is purely technocratic or does not require value judgments.266 It is rather that proportionality rejects the assumption that submitting policy judgments to
judicial review requires that they be submitted to distinctively juridical
technologies of dispute resolution — textual, historical, and case analysis, for example. Proponents of proportionality are relatively comfortable with transparent judicial second-guessing of policy judgments on
the ground that those judgments were qualitatively inadequate in light
of facts about the world.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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4. Authority and Justification. — The previous discussion gestures
at a defense of rights as trumps rooted in separation of powers. Judges
have a distinct role morality and institutional competence that orient
them toward tasks suited to private law dispute resolution and criminal
adjudication: textual exegesis in applying a statute; divining the will of
the parties, for example, to a will or contract;267 judging an actor’s intent
in order to determine his or her legal culpability. Rebalancing the government’s reasons for passing a law seems to exercise legislative power,
especially in the absence of a clearly delineated right.
Migrating judicial review from private to public law puts some pressure on this model. In a public law dispute, engaging in textual exegesis
or divining the intentions of the parties often entails direct confrontation
with the contrary political and even constitutional judgments of public
authorities. A legal culture committed to the justiciability of public law
disputes can respond to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction either
by seeking to draw clear lines of authority or by subjecting the actions
of the political branches to substantive demands for rationality. And so
Cohen-Eliya and Porat, borrowing loosely from the South African
scholar Etienne Mureinik,268 contrast what they describe as the
American legal tradition’s “culture of authority” with what they call an
emerging global legal “culture of justification.”269 Within a culture of
authority, public law “focuses on delimiting the borders of public action
and on ensuring that decisions are made only by those authorized to
make them.”270 Within a culture of justification, on the other hand, the
legitimacy of governmental action “is justified in terms of its cogency
and persuasiveness, that is, its rationality and reasonableness.”271
On Cohen-Eliya and Porat’s view, the U.S. political question doctrine and high barriers to standing are symptomatic of the U.S. legal
culture’s continued policing of lines of institutional political authority.272
Proportionality jurisdictions tend to have muted or nonexistent political
question doctrines and often have much lower standing requirements
than would be conceivable in U.S. federal courts.273 Many such jurisdictions permit review by governmental bodies, or subsets thereof, and
permit preenforcement (or even preenactment) challenges to legislation.274 These jurisdictions are less concerned with separation of powers
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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in the style envisioned by Montesquieu and more concerned with
reason-giving as the ultimate source of governmental power.275
III. CONSEQUENCES
There is no perfect technology of judicial review. Public law disputes
require judges with relatively little accountability to evaluate political
judgments premised on competing and often reasonable assessments of
constitutionality made by government officials. The core claim of this
Foreword is that a proportionality-like approach is better suited to adjudication of rights disputes within a rights-respecting democracy. This
Part substantiates that claim by highlighting the costs of rights as
trumps.
Section A engages with Dworkin’s well-known critique of balancing
and shows how his approach can emasculate rights as much as it can
protect them. Dworkin believed rights should be free of infringement
except in the face of contrary rights or genuine emergency. Proportionality does not concede that lack of meaningful review is the only alternative to rights as trumps or that other kinds of personal interests that
are not “rights” are left to legislative prerogative. In a complex society,
Dworkin’s binary view of rights puts too much pressure on the threshold
interpretive question of whether a right is at issue.
Section B discusses two broad ways in which rights as trumps distorts constitutional law. First, the frame frustrates the law’s ability to
align rights recognition with our collective sense of justice. Second, the
rights-as-trumps view encourages judges either to stretch doctrinal
frameworks that do not fit or to ignore such frameworks whenever they
feel inconvenient.
Section C argues that rights as trumps dulls the constitutional conscience of political actors by refusing to account for the constitutional
right of the community to embody its political vision in the law.
Section D then turns to a different and under-explored kind of cost.
Rights as trumps does not just coarsen our constitutional claims; it
coarsens us as citizens. A world in which a litigant is either a rightsbearer whose situation trumps contrary government action, or is not a
rights-bearer and is therefore at the mercy of the state, is a world of
enemies. In such a world, submitting a dispute to constitutional adjudication is a declaration that there is no space for negotiation between
the competing positions. The government’s claim is necessarily that the
rights-bearer is wholly beneath constitutional concern, and the rightsbearer’s claim is that the government is a bad actor and not just a
clumsy one. In a rapidly polarizing world, the judicial department must
do better than this.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Section E discusses some of proportionality’s own problems and offers some responses. The section highlights four in particular. First,
proportionality might ignore positive constitutional law, which might
not countenance rights inflation and which might condemn the rights
deflation implicit in proportionality. Second, proportionality does not
adequately distinguish between rights and interests. Third, proportionality makes judicial activism more transparent, which has both costs
and benefits. Finally, apex courts in systems in which constitutional
jurisdiction is decentralized have some duty to articulate legal rules in
order to promote coherence and uniformity.
A. Dworkin’s Critique
This Foreword’s title is a phrase and a concept commonly linked to
the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin. This section identifies the
points of departure from Dworkin’s ideas. At bottom, the critical point
of departure is that the claim this Foreword advances is not, as
Dworkin’s was, a deontological one about the nature of rights and the
moral duties the state owes to rights-bearers. It is, rather, a consequentialist argument that rests on a set of empirical assumptions about how
judicial review is practiced in U.S. courts. Varying those assumptions
varies the argument. Volumes have been written on Dworkin’s thought,
including his thinking about rights in particular.276 The inductive
method introduced above shows that this Foreword’s argument means
to be less a criticism of Dworkin than of the Court.277
Still, given that Dworkin’s defense of rights as trumps remains canonical, it is worth articulating why it does not meet, much less defeat,
the argument made here. Dworkin’s basic argument is that holding a
right limits the reasons that may be advanced for the government to
deprive the rights-bearer of whatever it is that the right protects.278
Those reasons may be grounded in the need to protect conflicting rights,
to prevent catastrophe, or perhaps to secure some other unusually significant public benefit, but they may not be grounded in a utilitarian
argument that the public is better off if the right is violated than if it is
honored.279 To hold a right that can be balanced away against the public good is not to hold one at all; it is, rather, to be at the majority’s
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mercy notwithstanding good reasons to suppose the majority has denied
the putative rights-holder equal concern and respect.280
Dworkin’s use of the term “right” is a specific one, as it must be for
him to endorse the dramatic consequences of identifying an abridgment.
Dworkin’s concern is neither with mere interests nor even with legally
or constitutionally protected entitlements, even those subjectively experienced as intense.281 Dworkin’s interest is in those rights “necessary to
protect [a person’s] dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern
and respect, or some other personal value of like consequence.”282 Moreover, the right to be governed by laws enacted by democratically chosen
representatives — which is to say, the right of a citizen to the fruits of
participation in self-governance — cannot count as a right in Dworkin’s
sense.283 Sustaining an individual right has the inevitable consequence
of infringing upon a “right” of a people to self-governance, at least in a
narrow sense. As Dworkin writes, “[a] right against the Government
must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks it would
be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for
having it done.”284
Because Dworkin is focused on rights that by his definition are of
fundamental importance, he is eager to say that abridging them on utilitarian grounds works an intense and certain dignitary harm. He is less
focused on the serious consequences of declaring that every other interest is not a right.285 To understand the consequences of treating people
in this way, consider the case of affirmative action, which Dworkin addresses in Taking Rights Seriously.286 The book was first published
three years after the Court decided DeFunis v. Odegaard,287 its first
foray into what was then commonly referred to as “reverse discrimination.” Marco DeFunis sued various public officials, alleging racial discrimination, after he was denied admission to the University of
Washington Law School.288 The case made its way to the Supreme
Court, which held that DeFunis’s suit, which sought injunctive relief,
was moot in light of the fact that, having won at various stages below,
he was already approaching graduation.289
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Addressing the merits, Dworkin argued that DeFunis had no constitutional right to race-neutral admission to a public law school.290 Because law schools discriminate in admissions as a matter of course, discriminating on the basis of race did not, without more, deprive DeFunis
of equal concern or respect.291 Of course, a black applicant denied admission to a public law school on the basis of racial animus does have a
constitutional claim,292 and so some theory is needed to explain why
accepting that claim but not DeFunis’s treats him as an equal. Dworkin
answers this concern with an elaborate argument: In the United States,
discrimination against blacks relies on “external” preferences (preferences regarding others rather than regarding ourselves) about human
virtue, whereas discrimination against whites in the form of affirmative
action relies mainly on ideal arguments about justice.293 Counting external preferences in a utilitarian calculus stacks the deck against the
targets of prejudice.294
Dworkin’s argument functions reasonably well as a cause for skepticism about utilitarian justifications for discrimination against racial
minorities. It does little to justify treating racial discrimination against
DeFunis as of no constitutional moment. If DeFunis has no rights, then
the school’s basis for discriminating against him need satisfy no more
than minimal rationality. The University of Washington had rejected
him through a two-track admissions program that subjected white students to a different and independent process from the one used for minority students.295 Under rational basis review, whether the university’s
racially selective policy was created with meticulous care or with nearly
maximal clumsiness should be irrelevant to a reviewing court. Whether
the policy classified applicants on the basis of test scores or geography
or race — if (and only if?) whites were disadvantaged — it would receive no meaningful constitutional scrutiny.
Whatever the ultimate result, that analysis would be blind to at least
two different (and related) social facts, both of which should matter to
constitutional adjudication. First, an analysis that treats some racial
classifications as beneath constitutional concern would not resonate
with Americans’ social experience of racial classification. The history
and continuing salience of race in the United States ensure that
governmental racial classification is a sensitive practice, one that feels
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different to its objects than, say, classification by census tract, and one
that citizens have good reason to scrutinize.
Second, race is different as a matter of positive constitutional law.
The Constitution singles out race as an invidious ground for discrimination, explicitly in the Fifteenth Amendment and implicitly through
the text and history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.296
For Dworkin, that observation begs the question. The Constitution’s
ban on discrimination implements an abstract principle,297 and Dworkin
is telling us, normatively, how to translate that principle into a rule of
decision in the specific instance of race-based affirmative action. Again,
Dworkin’s interest is in why invidious discrimination against blacks is
different from — and qualitatively worse than — race-based affirmative
action. One can reach the same conclusion and nonetheless believe that
a race-based affirmative action program requires greater justification
and must be implemented with greater care than a government program
that classifies individuals on other grounds. The Constitution compels
the latter view, and no Justice has ever contested it.298 Dworkin does
not provide us with the resources to know what to make of such a claim.
Nothing in the theory of rights as trumps obligates courts to treat all
mere interests in the same way. A constitutional law that treats rights
as trumps and subjects other governmental infringements on liberty to
a balancing test is intelligible, even if it does not describe the American
case. But once it is conceded that searching judicial review is sometimes
appropriate for mere interests, then Dworkin’s point of departure from
proportionality becomes a semantic one. It is consistent with proportionality to assume that certain rights infringements require an unusual
degree of justification above and beyond what might be required for
others.299 Whether all rights retain the name or whether some are relegated to “interests” or “values” or “bananas” is rhetorical.
Thus, Dworkin’s second conceptual point, that rights that are not
trumps are not rights at all, must be reevaluated. Majoritarianism entails that those policies that, on balance, improve the general welfare
more than they infringe on individual interests prevail. To call something a right, on Dworkin’s view, is to remove it from this stoic calculus.
It is simply wrong, though, to suggest that there is no analytic space
between rights as trumps and utilitarian balancing. Proportionality is a
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technology of justice that speaks precisely to Dworkin’s concern that the
“right” of a majority to see its policies enacted into law not be conflated
with the rights of individuals. For just as an individual may have mere
interests that do not implicate equal concern in the way that rights do,
so too do groups of citizens have rights to self-governance that may be
distinguished from mere interests in seeing to it that certain policies are
enacted.300
Proportionality analysis is an ordeal that requires the government to
justify its actions with evidence or good faith assumptions and to act
with restraint. In putting the government through its paces, proportionality sharpens the government’s ends and means to those that are
necessary to vindicate its interests and are respectful of the impact on
individuals. Proportionality does not treat rights as trumps, but neither
does it simply subject them to utilitarian balancing. Its aim is to take
individual rights, the government’s reasons, and the government’s
methods for no more and no less than they are worth.
B. Trumps as Distortions
Rights as trumps disfigures constitutional law. Section III.B.1 argues
that it dissociates rights from notions of substantive justice. Section
III.B.2 argues that it encourages judges to blur the edges of the categories they construct.
1. Too Little Justice. — Federal courts are not staffed by revolutionaries, philosophers, or divine heroes. Both as a matter of their temperament and the appointment strategy of those who appoint them, judges
are typically mainstream lawyers well attuned to the selfsame role morality that sustains the rights-as-trumps ideology. If the implication of
declaring an interest to be a right is that the right is immune from virtually any legislative or executive interference, judges socialized in this
way will be cautious in issuing such declarations, and appropriately
so. Dworkin himself performs that caution in reaching the improbable
conclusion that white applicants denied admission to a public university
in part on the basis of race have no constitutional claim at all.
Without more, rights as trumps disturbs the relationship between
constitutional law and justice.301 Thus, while substantive due process
empowers the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize fundamental rights
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300 See Stephen Gardbaum, Proportionality and Democratic Constitutionalism, in RULE OF
LAW, supra note 235, at 259, 271 (arguing that proportionality is attentive to the “demand[] of . . .
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301 See Jackson, supra note 114, at 3147.
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notwithstanding the lack of textual specification, there is no constitutional right to education, to food, to shelter, or to health care.302 But
drug companies have a right to receive pharmacy records so as to market pharmaceuticals to doctors with greater precision.303 Private individuals have the right to keep loaded handguns within blocks of the
White House and the Capitol,304 in one of the most violent cities in
America.305 One need not dispute the justice of these rights to believe
that they are not more fundamental or vital to human flourishing than
many other rights not recognized by the Court.
The difference between these rights and the many social and economic rights the Court has refused to entertain is not that they are necessarily better specified within the Constitution. It is rather that the
Court satisfied itself that it was able to articulate their limits. Dissenting
in McCleskey v. Kemp, the death penalty disparate impact case discussed
in Part II,306 Justice Brennan called the concern over the generativity of
rights a “fear of too much justice.”307 In the absence of a technology for
managing this fear, judges will act upon it. Proportionality is such a
technology.
One special application of this problem is conflicts of rights.
American courts rarely identify such conflicts even when their existence
is patent.308 Abortion presents no conflict because fetuses are not persons.309 Victims of hate speech or women objecting to pornography are
seeking to curtail speech, not seeking to vindicate their rights or the
rights of others.310 Victims of affirmative action claim rights against
racial discrimination, but beneficiaries are not viewed as claiming rights
to equal opportunity in elite education or government contracting.
Lochner v. New York311 is criticized for elevating the right to contract
rather than for failing to see embodied within the Bakeshop Act the
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302 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973); Jennifer Prah Ruger et
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303 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
304 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
305 Based on 2016 FBI crime statistics, the District of Columbia ranked seventeenth in murders
and fourteenth in robberies among American cities that reported crime data. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES tbl.4 (2016),
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306 See supra p. 44.
307 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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right to adequate working conditions. The couple in Masterpiece
Cakeshop present to the Court not as rights-bearers but merely as the
beneficiaries of a state “interest” in nondiscrimination against gay
people.
This lack of recognition reflects, in part, a reluctance to understand
legislation or other state action as furthering rather than sitting in opposition to constitutional rights.312 The problem is conceptual and not
just semantic. Adjudicating rights conflicts requires a balancing of
rights. The U.S. tiers-of-scrutiny framework is sometimes described as
a balancing test,313 but that description is accurate only in an attenuated
sense. Strict and intermediate scrutiny require a decisionmaker to assess
the motivations and internal logic of the government’s actions, but that
inquiry is sequestered from any assessment of the nature of the burden
imposed on the litigant. The U.S. framework tests the adequacy simpliciter of the government’s action, not its adequacy in light of the right
at stake. It is a stepwise approach that leaves no room for the relative
quality or value of the rights at stake to inform the ultimate issue. The
best a court can do within this framework is to declare that the government has a compelling or important interest in protecting a competing
right; it cannot assess the relative weights of the competitors.314
It must be acknowledged that using the presence of potential rights
conflicts to shorten the reach of rights has a dispiriting history in
American constitutional law. The best known academic response to
Brown v. Board of Education appeared in Professor Herbert Wechsler’s
1959 Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, which later became the
article Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.315 Wechsler
called for judges to issue “genuinely principled” judgments,316 by which
he meant those “that rest[] on reasons with respect to all the issues in
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved.”317
So stated, Wechsler’s admonition seems unremarkable, almost an axiomatic restatement of the rule of law. Where he ran into trouble was
in his specific application of this universalist creed to Brown. For
Wechsler, the notion that state-enforced racial segregation, race-neutral
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See infra section III.C, pp. 77–79.
See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection
Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1079–80 (2011).
314 A rights-as-trumps frame is likewise unable to account for the presence of variations on the
same right that populate both sides of a political conflict. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF RISK 79 (2014); David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 221, 221 (2016).
315 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
316 Id. at 15.
317 Id. at 19.
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on its face, worked a special kind of injury on blacks was not sustainable
as a ground for judicial decision.318 Instead, the real issue was that it
infringed on the freedom of association, but so too did its remedy: “[I]f
the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant. Is
this not the heart of the issue involved, a conflict in human claims of
high dimension . . . [?]”319 On this view, Brown was a conflict of rights,
with no principled basis for judicial resolution.
Wechsler was wrong, but it is important to say why. To call the right
sought by black students and parents “freedom of association” misses
the Jim Crow laws’ meaning for their text.320 But that is not to say
Brown did not present a conflict of rights. Supporters of segregation
did indeed believe their freedom of association was at stake,321 and they
had a prima facie right to protect that freedom through the law.322 The
problem is that, in this instance, that right was invested with racial animus and conflicted with the far stronger rights of their fellow citizens
to equal treatment. It is perfectly sensible — and judicially manageable — for the positive constitutional law of a jurisdiction to privilege
rights of equal treatment, especially on the basis of race and especially
at scale, over rights of association. That is just what the Brown Court
did, without saying so. But to deny that any associational interests are
at issue at all invites just the Wechsler response: an accusation of unprincipled decisionmaking.
Wechsler saw very clearly, and with trepidation, that in order for
modern constitutional law to move beyond the deference regime encapsulated in United States v. Carolene Products, it would have to resolve
value conflicts.323 It faces three basic options in the face of such conflicts. First, it can stand down and let the democratic process play out.
This was Wechsler’s answer: “When no sufficient reasons of this kind
can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of
the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive.”324
Second, it can assume away any conflict. This is the modern Court’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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321 See, e.g., 102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956) (statement of Sen. George) (presenting the Southern
Manifesto); see also Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospective, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503,
508 n.34 (1997).
322 It is worth noting, though, that black citizens were widely disenfranchised in most jurisdictions that had de jure segregated schools. See Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21
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answer. Third, it can acknowledge the interests on all sides and nonetheless resolve the conflict. This is proportionality.
The disjunction between rights and justice that rights as trumps encourages makes some sense of the surprising lack of any constitutional
duty on the part of the government to protect its citizens from private
violence. The Supreme Court has affirmed with admirable clarity that
there is no such duty.325 And yet we not unreasonably tend to conceive
of our interest in physical safety in rights terms, whether as a natural
entitlement to security or as part of a solemn bargain as law-abiding and
taxpaying members of a political community.326 Conceiving of such
rights as absolute would put on the table arguments for a radical judicial
reordering of budgetary priorities and local government law.327 The
infeasibility of that outcome should not, however — and does not logically — carry with it the dystopian corollary that the state bears no
constitutional responsibility to its citizens at all.328
2. Judicial Subterfuge. — Rights as trumps obscures the stakes of
constitutional conflict not just by substantively ignoring or erasing inconvenient constitutional values but also by slipping those values into
ill-fitting garments. Consider Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc.329 The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) offers specialty
license plates to drivers, who may choose among an assortment of designs that have met the approval of its Board.330 The state division of
the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) submitted a design that included an image of the Confederate battle flag.331 The Board rejected
the design and the SCV sued, claiming a violation of its freedom of
speech.332
The DMV discriminated against the SCV on the basis of viewpoint.
The DMV Board did not approve of the message the rebel flag embodied, or perhaps feared the reactions of others who might disapprove, and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
325 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 620–21 (2000); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–
96 (1989).
326 See, e.g., TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RIGHTS 20 (1947) (“Vital to the integrity of the individual and to the stability of a democratic society is the right of each individual to physical freedom, to security against illegal violence,
and to fair, orderly legal process.”).
327 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1973).
328 See Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY
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329 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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so it refused to permit a design including that message.333 As presently
understood, the First Amendment almost never permits the government
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.334 And yet the State won, in
a 5–4 decision that improbably united Justices Thomas, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.335 How?
Put to one side the legally correct outcome in the case, about which
reasonable minds can (and did) differ, and consider instead where first
principles might lead. Ritual incantation of “viewpoint discrimination”
fails to capture the complexity of the case. The State’s relationship
to the Confederate “message” is ambiguous — Texas celebrates
Confederate Heroes Day as a state holiday every January 19, and a visitor to the state capitol can buy replica stars and bars in the gift
shop336 — and so one might reasonably question why the SCV was singled out. The SCV has a substantial interest in freedom of expression,
but its speech was not of particularly high value. It was not, in context,
intended to contribute to political debate (or so the SCV claimed337),
though the possibility that others would perceive the message as having
political content is inarguable. More importantly, the sanction here —
denial of state license plate real estate — was not exactly pillory and the
stocks. Above all, perhaps, Texas was once a Confederate state, and the
message the flag conveys — to some, and reasonably — is advocacy of
treason in the name of racial subordination.
Rights as trumps makes it difficult for an adjudicator to appreciate
these nuances. Viewpoint discrimination is equally unconstitutional no
matter the content of the message, and First Amendment law is remarkably insensitive to the nature of the sanction.338 But to escape the strictest scrutiny requires a leap into some doctrinal space that blinds itself
entirely to the legitimate speech interests in the case and the somewhat
suspicious way in which Texas curtailed them here. The frame the U.S.
approach encourages is prone to devastating hypotheticals from both
directions. What if an applicant wanted to display a dismembered fetus,
or a burning cross, or a swastika (Justice Ginsburg’s example at oral
argument)?339 Ah, but what if the government permitted Republican
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messages but not Democratic ones (Justice Kagan’s example at oral
argument)?340
The actual majority opinion in the Walker case sought refuge in the
government speech doctrine. Government speech is not restricted — at
all — by the First Amendment in its ability to engage in content or
viewpoint discrimination.341 What this rubric gained in convenience it
lost in credibility, however, and Justice Alito made quick work of it in
dissent. The DMV had approved specialty plates with the names of
dozens of private organizations, with favorite soft drinks and burgers,
with state colleges from other states, with a tribute to the NASCAR
driver (and native Californian) Jeff Gordon, and with whimsical slogans
such as “Rather Be Golfing.”342 To call these license plates “government
speech” is to stretch the category beyond recognition. But under current
doctrine, not to do so would have meant that Texas must either permit
swastikas or abandon its specialty license plate program.
The sleight of hand the Walker majority performed is endemic to
U.S. constitutional law. Section II.A.1 above discusses the breakdown
of the tiers-of-scrutiny regime in disability and affirmative action cases.
The same has occurred in cases implicating the rights of gays and lesbians, where there has been much hand-wringing over the standard of
review the Court is applying.343 Outside of antidiscrimination law, cross
burning, abortion clinic protests, and refusals to accommodate religious
organizations have routinely been shoehorned into categories that do not
match.344 When the boxes that structure American constitutional law
do not fit or would lead to inconvenient outcomes, judges (consciously
or not) grab hold of the closest one that will do. Wechsler’s critique goes
as much to this practice as it does to proportionality, but it misses what
his contemporary Professor Alexander Bickel saw more clearly: the
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alternative to “unprincipled” — I prefer “particularist” — judicial decisionmaking is not simply principled decisionmaking; it is as often abdication of judicial review.345
C. Political Constitutionalism
It is common for public law scholars to lament the demise of any
serious ethic of political constitutionalism in U.S. constitutional discourse. These calls typically promote the capacity of legislatures or
agencies either to attend to the popular engagement or to perform the
moral deliberation that, on these accounts, rights discourse demands.
Some are in the “popular constitutionalist” mode, emphasizing the constitutional judgments that reside within nonjudicial political and social
institutions.346 Thus, Professor Jeremy Waldron faults the U.S. mode of
judicial review for devolving rights identification to the distracted modalities of judicial opinions.347 Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel
distinguish the Court’s regnant “enforcement” model of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment from a “policentric” approach that imagines
Congress as implementing views about rights that reside within the constitutional culture.348 Professor Cass Sunstein finds judicial minimalism
especially useful when it serves to “promote political accountability and
political deliberation.”349
Another, dovetailing critique emerges from a critical legal studies
(CLS) tradition that views rights as dampening or distracting from progressive politics and undermining the bonds of social solidarity.
Professor Mark Tushnet views rights as unstable, indeterminate, and
often useless or worse.350 Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger describes as a “dirty little secret[]” of contemporary jurisprudence a
“discomfort with democracy” evident in, for example:
the ceaseless identification of restraints upon majority rule, rather than of
restraints upon the power of dominant minorities, as the overriding responsibility of judges and jurists . . . [and] opposition to all institutional reforms,
particularly those designed to heighten the level of popular political engagement, as threats to a regime of rights.351
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That regime, as Professor Robin West describes, is not always “comedic,” but has significant elements of tragedy, of individuals “who want
very much to connect in meaningful ways with others, but who find
those desires for connection frustrated” by a liberal, individualistic
rights culture.352
The challenge these projects confront is not simply to describe how
rights are articulated within an explicitly political discourse. It is also
to account for the separation between judicial and political constitutionalism that has developed over time. The root of declining constitutional
conscience within the political branches does not lie just in the Court’s
self-aggrandizing pretensions of judicial supremacy353 or, as Professor
Keith Whittington has suggested, in the strategic self-interest of political
actors.354 It lies as well in the way in which judges and others within
the constitutional culture conceptualize rights.
Understanding rights as trumps limits political actors’ points of entry
into adjudication. Constitutional law becomes less about the particulars
of the government’s behavior, the acts it passes, the players’ motivations, the evidence the legislature or agencies gather, or the policy objectives they pursue, and more about the abstracted right the government
is alleged to have violated. The contours of that right are treated as
predetermined by text, structure, history, and precedent, its contact with
the imperatives of modern life artificially severed. Shifting policy goals,
updated empirical investigation, or renewed moral or political deliberation — in short, the things democratic actors do — are only interstitially
relevant to the scope and substance of rights within such a regime.
“Rights” become solely the province of judges; when identified, the government loses unless its “interests” are especially compelling or important and its laws or practices well tailored to those interests. One
should expect any political institutional capacity for developing constitutional rights to atrophy in such an environment, and it has.
The idea that rights are not a proper subject of politics is deeply felt,
but misguided. As section IV.B discusses below, it is quite opposite the
predominant view of rights both at the U.S. constitutional founding and
during Reconstruction. We tend not to question the pathological roots
of the proposition that the political branches cannot be trusted to protect
the rights of those who are not in power.355 Proportionality’s emphasis
on justification and instrumental rationality can accommodate mistrust,
but it does so in a way that is consistent with the proposition that, in a
pluralistic environment, rights are destined to be in tension with each
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other. Politics is the place where the citizens of a mature democracy
negotiate that tension.
D. Relational Injury
The consequences of the rights-as-trumps frame are not limited to
bloodless doctrinal formulae, or even to substantive constitutional decisions. Recall Dworkin’s view that an African American student has a
right not to have race used against him in admissions to the University
of Washington Law School, but that Marco DeFunis had no such
right.356 A dual commitment to rights as trumps and to the constitutional validity of race-based affirmative action requires this conclusion.
No Supreme Court Justice has ever argued that rational basis review is
appropriate in cases of race-based affirmative action,357 but for clarity
of argument let us assume that, in some Socratic sense, Dworkin is correct about DeFunis’s rights, or lack thereof.
This proposition communicates to DeFunis not simply that he has
lost but that he does not matter.358 Much is at stake when constitutional
law tells people who advance reasonable rights claims that they have no
rights the law is bound to respect.359 For one thing, this legal posture
affects how the parties relate to each other. If the University owes nothing to DeFunis, it has no incentive beyond the mechanics of electoral
accountability to moderate its practices to accommodate his interests. It
need not negotiate with similarly situated citizens except insofar as those
citizens have the power, in line with their compatriots, to effect democratic change. Awarding a broader array of prima facie rights would
help to vindicate the insight, memorialized in footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,360 that because we protect our rights
through ordinary politics, the role of courts is to ensure that those politics are amenable to mutual accommodation.361 The use of adjudicatory
tools that force politics is even more significant when decisionmaking
bodies operate subject to relatively weak mechanisms of political accountability such as those governing admissions officers or law enforcement personnel.
A second relational consequence of telling those holding plausible
constitutional rights claims that such claims are not even prima facie
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valid is that it places us in an adversarial rather than a cooperative
posture vis-à-vis other members of the polity.362 If my assertion of rights
depends strictly on your lack thereof, and vice versa, it is natural for me
to see you not as a friend whose different commitments must be reconciled with mine but rather as an enemy who is, in too real a sense, out
to destroy me. In making judges the gatekeepers of political membership rather than simply the adjudicators of disputes, the categorical
frame tends to raise rather than lower the stakes of politics.363 Losers
come to see their political charge as producing a sea change sufficient to
overwhelm or marginalize the position of the median Justice, or else
replace him or her entirely.
Recall Masterpiece Cakeshop. We have already chronicled some of
the polemical ways in which the Justices framed the case at oral argument. The briefs by both the parties and the amici are likewise littered
with slippery slope arguments that purport to demonstrate the dystopian
universe the other side’s position contemplates and invites. If those
briefs are to be believed, a holding in favor of the same-sex couple, Craig
and Mullins, would mean that “the compelled speech doctrine would
cease to exist,”364 that the Thirteenth Amendment would be violated,365
and that the government could “compel attendance at religious rituals.”366 It could disbar Christian lawyers and strip Christian doctors of
their medical licenses.367 It could force Jehovah’s Witness children to
salute the flag, or force Virginia Baptists to pay to support mainstream
Christian teaching.368 It would be consistent with the Spanish
Inquisition,369 akin to forcing Christians to bow before Roman gods,370
to forcing Jews to submit to the golden statue of Nebuchadnezzar,371 to
the beheading of Sir Thomas More for refusing to affirm the annulment
of Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon and sign the Oath of
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Succession confirming Anne Boleyn’s place as Queen of England.372 As
one brief put it, “the gay marriage movement ‘has moved from tolerance
to totalitarianism.’”373
A win for Phillips, the baker, would likewise be dismal (though perhaps not equally so) according to the briefs in support of the
couple. Arguments of Phillips’s sort have been used “to justify antimiscegenation laws”374 and “school segregation.”375 “Landlords could
refuse to rent to interracial couples, employers could refuse to hire
women or pay them less than men, and a bus line could refuse to drive
women to work . . . .”376 “[A] racist baker could refuse to sell ‘Happy
Birthday’ cakes to African-American customers, a screen printer could
refuse to sell a banner announcing a Muslim family’s reunion, and a
tailor could refuse to sell a gay man a custom suit for a charity gala.”377
“[A] family portrait studio could enforce a ‘No Mexicans’ policy. A banquet hall could refuse to host events for Jewish people. A hair salon
could turn away a lesbian woman who wants a new hair style”378 or
refuse to help a teenage girl prepare for her quinceañera out of opposition to Mexican immigration.379
Of course, lawyers in an adversarial system often characterize their
opponents’ cases in negative terms. The categorical frame does not create this practice.380 But in denying both courts and litigants any resources for moderating the potential reach of their claims, it almost
requires it. Lawyering of this sort is both interpersonally alienating and
misleading. The objection to slippery slope arguments of this kind mirrors successful hermeneutic objections to original intent arguments in
the 1980s.381 Placing oneself into the decisional posture of a long-ago
historical actor requires leaps of imagination that corrupt the exercise.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
372
373

Id. at 6.
Brief Amicus Curiae of Public Advocate of the United States et al. in Support of Petitioners,
supra note 365, at 16 (quoting The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel television broadcast Apr. 1,
2015) (statement of John Stossel)).
374 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of
Respondents at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
375 Id. at 10.
376 Brief in Opposition at 25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
377 Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission, supra note 9, at 4.
378 Id. at 16.
379 Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins, supra note 9, at 48.
380 See generally DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 3–4 (2008).
381 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 221–22 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983); see also BOBBITT, supra note 23, at 24
(noting that certain modes of historical argument depend on the assumption that “we, from our very
different lives, can know what [the Founders] would have thought in situations within which they
would have been, of course, very different people”).

82

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:28

A society that permits the beheading of religious dissenters or that prohibits interracial marriage is one whose legal, political, and social norms
are so different from our own that performing the hypothetical is not a
controlled experiment. The social meaning of practices that people do
not in fact engage in is different from the meaning of practices they
engage in pervasively.
The benefit of proportionality done well is to force litigants and their
fellow citizens to match their claims to this world, and to acknowledge
the mutual and legitimate presence within it of others who hold contrary
values and commitments. On this view, constitutional law should seek
not to police the boundaries of the political community but rather to
structure politics so that those within that community are able to see,
hear, and speak to each other.
A darker conception of the nature of the political is available, indeed
familiar. Carl Schmitt famously described politics as grounded in the
distinction between friend and enemy.382 For Schmitt, what defines a
group as a political community as opposed to a community aligned
along some substantive set of commitments is that its members conceive
of outsiders as enemies and are willing to fight for the group’s preservation.383 In conspicuously sequestering rights, presumptively absolute,
from interests, which are of no constitutional concern, the rights-astrumps frame invites us to understand political communities in
Schmittian terms, where political conflict is, in its nature, existential.
Our constitutional fate might well lie in Schmittian democracy,384 but
whether the judicial branch hastens or arrests that development is a
choice.
As damaging as the adversarial relation the rights-as-trumps frame
encourages among citizens is the distance it enforces between individual
rights claimants and the constitutional system itself. As Professor
Robert Cover once suggested in these pages, we all hold dear our own
constitutions in exile.385 Abolitionists such as Lysander Spooner and
Frederick Douglass imagined a constitutional law that prohibited (or at
least did not support) chattel slavery.386 Suffragists such as Virginia
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
382 See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., Univ.
of Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932).
383 See id. at 32–33.
384 See Jamal Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93, 95 (2018).
385 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term — Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 15–18 (1983) (“The precepts we call law are marked off by social control over
their provenance, their mode of articulation, and their effects. But the narratives that create and
reveal the patterns of commitment, resistance, and understanding — patterns that constitute the
dynamic between precept and material universe — are radically uncontrolled.” Id. at 17 (footnote
omitted).).
386 See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 54–114 (1845);
Frederick Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? (Mar.
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Minor and Susan B. Anthony viewed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments as giving women the right to vote.387 Progressive Era labor advocates saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a right to strike and
to bargain collectively.388 Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood
Marshall, and their soldiers-in-arms saw an end to separate but equal
schools and public accommodations. The National Rifle Association
saw an individual right to bear arms hiding in plain sight in the
words of the Second Amendment. Modern libertarians heap scorn on
Williamson v. Lee Optical389 and modern progressives give like treatment to Citizens United.
These alternative constitutional visions do not represent sour grapes
or bad faith so much as a shadow constitutional law, a coherent set of
normative orderings that await the social and political conditions
needed to summon them from the front (or even the back) bench. Any
pluralistic society will include, indeed will be constituted by, a mosaic
of competing and contested visions of constitutional meaning and application. In Cover’s evocative, Foucauldian terms, decisional law is fundamentally jurispathic, seeking to kill off these alternatives and reinforce the state’s monopoly on coercive authority.390 But Cover
emphasizes that there are more and less final ways of doing so. Leaving
alternative visions of the constitutional good the space — some space —
to flower and to cultivate responses to the current regime is necessary if
we are to reconcile justice with law’s immanent violence.391
The early CLS critics of rights were concerned with law’s jurispathic
tendencies, but they generally lacked the benefit of any practical exposure to alternative technologies of rights adjudication. Foreign court
experiences with proportionality were nascent and not in wide circulation among judges and scholars. So long as we take the business of
courts to be declaring the substance and reach of rights, as the rightsas-trumps ideology envisions, the inadequacies of rights that CLS critics
identified translate quite directly into the inadequacies of courts. The
most trenchant pushback against that critique, from critical race and
feminist legal theorists who emphasized the differential importance of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26, 1860), in 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467
(1950).
387 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 163–64 (1874); United States v. Anthony, 24
F. Cas. 829, 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459).
388 See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and
the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47–50 (2002).
389 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
390 Cover, supra note 385, at 40; see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
16 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
391 See Sunstein, supra note 349, at 20–21 (emphasizing the usefulness of judicial decisions based
on “incompletely theorized agreements,” id. at 20, in cases of intense theoretical disagreement).
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rights to the agency of dispossessed people relative to white men,392 in
turn becomes a defense of courts taking rights just as seriously as
Dworkin urged. We see a similar dynamic between judicial minimalists
and their critics.393 A frame that nests rights in opposition to majoritarianism structures a further set of oppositions that keep the law reviews busy but are short on consensus.394
Proportionality invites parties with a diverse set of commitments to
remain invested in the constitutional system rather than alienated from
it.395 It assures them that if they do not win today, they might win
tomorrow on different facts. That assurance can be subversive in seeking to submit a totalitarian or white supremacist state to basic human
rights law. But it is indispensable where the paradigm case is one of
reasonable, good faith disagreement over the scope of individual rights
and government powers.
This Foreword presents a proportionality frame as an aspiration for
judicial review within a mature constitutional democracy. There are
two related propositions that it is important to disclaim before moving
forward. First, to say that rights as trumps is ill-suited to retail denials
of rights is not to say that proportionality is necessarily ill-suited to
wholesale denials. Indeed, as Part V discusses in the context of specific
cases, proportionality and the remedial discretion that often accompanies it can in some instances further a court’s resolve in addressing such
denials. Second, to say that rights as trumps contributes to social alienation and political polarization is not to say that it is the sole or even a
significant cause, nor is it to say that proportionality will substantially
alleviate these ills. Indeed, the prevailing polarization itself likely contributes to the rights-as-trumps instinct, producing a cycle from which
escape will be challenging. But even if judicial method plays a minor
role in our relational problems, aspirational thinking remains valuable
here, as for normative legal scholarship more generally. As Dworkin

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
392 See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404–05 (1987).
393 Compare KRAMER, supra note 346, at 8 (advocating for judicial minimalism as an element
of “popular constitutionalism”), with Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1380 (1997) (criticizing judicial minimalism and
arguing for judicial supremacy).
394 Cf. Post & Siegel, supra note 167, at 374 (seeking an account of democratic constitutionalism
that occupies this liminal space).
395 There is good reason to think that legal procedures individuals experience as fair have a significant effect on participants’ assessments of the legitimacy and performance of legal authorities,
including courts. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94–97 (1990). Procedural
justice also strongly influences attitudes toward other kinds of organizations. See Sheldon
Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of Procedural and Distributive Justice in Organizational
Behavior, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 177, 192–93 (1987).
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once said of constitutional interpretation, the only alternative to aiming
at happy endings is to aim at unhappy ones.396
E. The Costs of Proportionality
Proportionality is not perfect, still less in practice than in theory. It
has been blamed for lawlessness in Brazilian courts;397 for a too-casual
attitude toward the rights of minorities, as for example in religious freedom cases arising out of France, Italy, and Turkey;398 and more generally for blurring the line between law and politics, especially at the final
balancing stage.399 This section discusses some of these costs and defends the place of proportionality in modern systems of judicial review,
including the United States.
1. Proportionality as Construction. — To the degree proportionality
is associated with rights inflation, it relates uncomfortably to what were
once referred to as “interpretivist” methods of constitutional interpretation and construction. These methods view constitutional interpretation
as grounded in an excavation of legal meaning from the text, structure,
and history of the Constitution rather than in more dynamic or pragmatic methods that weigh precedent, practical consequences, or assessments of modern values more heavily in deciding constitutional
questions.400
This objection, such as it is, is simply a restatement of the problem.
That is, the project is just to expose the tension between the categorical
frame’s marriage to interpretivist methods and the role constitutional
courts play in modern democratic governance. Still, the objection has
real force within U.S. constitutional culture. To someone committed —
whatever the reason — to the view that the Constitution’s meaning and
application are fairly well specified by its historically determined text
and structure, and also that that meaning is discoverable and binds
judges, the Foreword’s project is poorly conceived. It mounts a consequentialist challenge to a deontological ethic.401
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
396 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 38 (1996).
397 See Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior, Freedom of Expression: What Lessons Should We Learn
from U.S. Experience?, 13 REVISTA DIREITO GV 274, 281–82 (2017).
398 See S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341, paras. 142–59 (upholding France’s ban on
the full-face veil as reasonably proportionate to the aim of “living together,” id. para. 142); Lautsi
v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 61, 99–102 (Rozakis, J., concurring) (upholding Italy’s law requiring
crucifixes to be displayed in public school classrooms based on proportionality analysis); Sahin v.
Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, paras. 116–23, 157–62 (finding that Turkey’s ban on university
students wearing headscarves was a justified interference with the rights to freedom of religion and
education).
399 See PETERSEN, supra note 235, at 38–49, 58–59.
400 See ELY, supra note 47, at 1; Jackson, supra note 114, at 3166.
401 See Grant Huscroft, Proportionality and the Relevance of Interpretation, in RULE OF LAW,
supra note 235, at 186, 187–88 (“Whether a particular right is protected by a bill of rights, and what
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The Supreme Court has never viewed rights adjudication so narrowly. The Court has long adopted a presumptively originalist posture
in cases of first impression having to do with relatively specific structural provisions,402 but it has never viewed constitutional rights through
the kind of originalist lens that would resist transsubstantive proportionality analysis. In equal protection, fundamental rights, free speech,
and criminal procedure cases alike, the Court has relied on heuristics
and balancing tests derived through common law iteration rather than
textual analysis.403 The Court’s refusal to recognize certain rights has
often been grounded in the kinds of pragmatic concerns that proportionality would help to allay,404 but rarely has its austerity in identifying
new rights been rooted simply in respect for the Constitution’s text,
structure, and history.
It is true that some scholars and the occasional judge have gestured
at the kind of narrow textualist originalism that would jettison existing
rights precedents.405 Many modern originalists, however, adopt a distinction between the practice of gauging the semantic meaning of legal
terms and the practice of adjudicating or otherwise resolving conflicts
that are constrained but not determined by those terms. Professors
Keith Whittington, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, and Lawrence Solum,
among others, have described the former as “interpretation” and the
latter as “construction.”406 Relatedly, Professor Christopher Green has
emphasized the sense-reference distinction, which, derived from the philosophy of language, distinguishes the meaning a word expresses from
the outcomes it accomplishes through that expression.407 One detects
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
its protection entails, are questions prior to the authority of courts to engage in proportionality
analysis.” Id. at 188.).
402 See Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1658–80 (2016).
403 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883–84, 888 (1996); David A. Strauss, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term — Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28–52 (2015).
404 See supra Part II, pp. 38–65.
405 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 835 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
based on original understanding that laws regulating speech directed at minors are not protected
by the First Amendment); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812, 837–38 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Second Amendment applies
to the states because of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980, 998–99 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the right to abortion is not constitutionally
protected because the Constitution says nothing about it); cf. John O. McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 843, 917–18 (2016) (arguing for a limited role for constitutional construction to supplement interpretation).
406 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5–7 (1999); JACK
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 5 (2011); BARNETT, supra note 267, at 123; Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 272 (2017).
407 See Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 555, 559 (2006); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD

87

an echo to the difference between what a word connotes and what it
denotes, a Millian idea that the High Court of Australia has been known
to deploy to prevent its own well-known originalism from becoming an
interpretive straitjacket.408
These strategies seek to preserve the relevance of textualist originalism to a Constitution whose original meaning can be fixed at only a
broad level of generality. As a matter of original textual meaning, an
American has no less a right to feed pigeons in a square than to use birth
control, have an abortion, marry, or attend a racially integrated public
school. Which is to say that refusing to recognize pigeon-feeding claims
results from consequentialist considerations of administrability, value
judgments about the worth of the activity, historical arguments about
judicial precedents, and so forth, not from the text and history of the
Constitution. Proportionality analysis brings these kinds of considerations to bear forthrightly. It indeed may be redescribed as a stepwise,
transsubstantive framework for constitutional construction. Buying
into proportionality requires the lawyer, scholar, judge, or citizen to concede that the Constitution’s text gives scant instruction as to how rights
may be limited. It does not require him or her to disclaim that the
Constitution limits the rights we have or to deny that some constitutional rights may be burdened more than others.
2. Rights and Interests. — Proportionality has drawn criticism for
failing to distinguish rights from mere interests. Professor Grégoire
Webber argues, for example, that proportionality analysis disaggregates
rights from justice, and in doing so alters the suite of duties and obligations that rights supply.409 What a community owes its rights-bearers
in virtue of having a right is a question of justice, grounded in the moral
equality of humans.410 Treating rights as trumps ensures that we treat
them righteously,411 that we affirm them even in the face of compelling
arguments for interference.412
This perspective suffers from an epistemic problem that Professor
Waldron succinctly articulates: “There are many of us, and we disagree
about justice.”413 And not just that. In the usual case, that disagreement
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
INTERPRETATION 115, 116 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (differentiating between “what some officials intended to say in enacting the language they used, and what they intended — or expected or
hoped — would be the consequence of their saying it”).
408 See Street v. Queensl Bar Ass’n (1989) 168 CLR 461, 537–38 (Austl.) (Dawson, J.); JOHN
STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC: RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 19 (Longmans, Green
& Co. 1911) (1843).
409 See Grégoire Webber, On the Loss of Rights, in RULE OF LAW, supra note 235, at 123,
126–31.
410 See id. at 143.
411 I am grateful to Professor Jessie Allen for this evocative formulation.
412 See Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, 7 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 468, 490 (2009).
413 WALDRON, supra note 29, at 1; see also GLENDON, supra note 25, at 16.
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is reasonable and in good faith. “It is not,” Waldron writes in Law and
Disagreement, “a case of there being some of us who are in possession
of the truth about rights — a truth which our opponents wilfully or
irrationally fail to acknowledge because they are blinded by ignorance,
prejudice or interest.”414 Rather, he offers, “[t]he issues that rights implicate . . . are simply hard questions — matters on which reasonable
people differ.”415 In Law and Disagreement and elsewhere, Waldron
marshals the fact of reasonable, good-faith disagreement about rights
against what he describes as “American-style judicial review,”416 the
subject and target of this Foreword. He does not believe that the institution of judicial review has much to recommend it in resolving conflicts
over rights in a functioning, rights-respecting democracy, given that the
varying moral and philosophical commitments that divide citizens over
rights also divide judges and direct their opinions.417
One need not adopt Waldron’s skepticism about judicial review tout
court to believe that his insight carries serious implications for the practice of judicial review. Constitutional adjudication is a decision procedure for resolving disagreements implicating rights, but it is not the
best — or even a good — decision procedure for getting at the underlying truth of the matter. As Waldron emphasizes, judges resolve rights
disputes in just the way their training and comparative expertise recommend: not through philosophical analysis or moral inspection but
through the bloodless jargon of precedents and doctrinal tests.418 The
distinctly legalistic way in which judges purport to resolve rights disputes has its advantages, but — and here’s the point — helping society
to distinguish rights from interests is not one of them.
We can assume there is value in distinguishing rights from interests
without assuming that doing so is the judiciary’s predominant task. Indeed, one way of describing the enduring difference between rights as
trumps and a proportionality framework is that the former tends to
assimilate rights adjudication to the existential question of whether an
individual claims a right or an interest, whereas the latter reserves judgment on the weight of the interest until the final stage of adjudication.
If and when the proportionality court reaches that final stage of balancing in the strict sense, it may be empowered to assess the weight of the
interest directly rather than through the smoke of precedent and doctrinal formulae. And so rights as trumps front-loads questions of rights
definition that judges, justifiably fearful of their own capacity and legitimacy, address mechanistically. Practiced well, proportionality does not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
414
415
416
417
418

WALDRON, supra note 29, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 15; see also Waldron, supra note 347, at 1366–69.
Waldron, supra note 347, at 1393–95.
Id. at 1383.
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avoid those questions altogether but back-loads them, reserving a constitutional court’s primary analysis for empirical questions that lend
themselves to the kind of dispassionate inquiry to which judges are indeed better suited than are politicians.
3. The Perils of Transparency. — A third significant criticism of proportionality cuts somewhat against the grain of the last. It is that
proportionality is a bit too on the nose. Forcing arguments about rights
into boxes that cannot accommodate the messiness of modern life but
that seem to lend themselves to juridification enables a constitutional
culture to maintain the fiction of a depoliticized judiciary. On this view,
it is just because judges seem to bring an elite lawyer’s toolkit to rights
disputes that we rely upon them to defuse those disputes. Proportionality instead requires judges more forthrightly to mimic the decisional
processes of legislatures, which risks decreasing the legitimacy of courts
and undermining their dispute resolution capacity. The opiate of the
masses is not religion on this view, but law.
I must take this criticism seriously not least because it appears to
implicate some of my own previous work.419 Constitutional judges
need, in Professor Neil Siegel’s formulation, to safeguard the conditions
of their own legitimacy.420 When such judges write opinions and issue
judgments, they have a duty to offer reasoned arguments articulated in
the conventional language of constitutional discourse.421 The case must
draw, to varying degrees, on constitutional text, structure, history, precedent, or prudential judgment rather than, say, on partisan politics, the
judge’s personal financial stakes, Zen sutras, or the drawing of lots. But
I have emphasized that judicial duty extends beyond simply the form
the opinion takes; judges also have a duty to try to persuade colleagues
on the bench, the parties to the case, public officials, and the citizenry
more generally that what they are doing is consistent with their role.422
Attending to the forms of argument is designed to serve that end, but it
should not be confused with the end itself.423
In short, judges have to exaggerate or obfuscate sometimes.424
Professor Charles Black gestured in this direction in his discussion of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
419 See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389,
1395 (2013) [hereinafter Greene, Pathetic Argument]; Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive
Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253, 284–89 (2016) [hereinafter Greene, Meming].
420 Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008).
421 See BOBBITT, supra note 23, at 5–6.
422 See Greene, Meming, supra note 419, at 290.
423 See Greene, Pathetic Argument, supra note 419, at 1420–22.
424 See GLENDON, supra note 25, at 44 (“What’s wrong with a little exaggeration, one might
ask, especially in furtherance of something as important as individual rights?”); Amsterdam, supra
note 39, at 350 (“[T]he Court cannot always state openly all of the considerations that affect its
decisions.”); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1,
16–25 (1979) (suggesting reasons why Supreme Court opinions might not fully reflect the collective
views of those who join them).
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Justice Black, the Justice most associated with the idea of rights as
trumps. In his inaugural James Madison Lecture at New York
University School of Law in 1960, Justice Black had argued that “there
are ‘absolutes’” in the Bill of Rights, “and that they were put there on
purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be ‘absolutes.’”425 Like many of his contemporaries in the
academy and at the bar,426 Professor Black was skeptical (in a way) of
this claim. The determination of what counts as a right in the first place
requires some balancing,427 and in any event, “[n]o right, however defined, ever turns out to be really ‘absolute,’ if you think about it long
enough.”428 The point was obvious — Dworkin, too, conceded it429 —
but it led Professor Black to reason that what was really at stake in the
Justice’s posture was not the substance of rights but rather what he
called “attitude.”430 He wrote:
On the whole it seems clear . . . that the man who prefers to look on the Bill
of Rights guarantees, once they are defined, as “absolutes” will see them
as more broadly defined and enforce them with more resolution than will
the man who prefers to stress their character as invitations to start
“balancing.”431

For Professor Black, whether Justice Black was truly being misleading in professing that rights are absolute depended on “where we want
to be led.”432 There is value in a posture of viewing rights as not merely
convenient, and indeed the Bill of Rights is faithfully read as embodying
that value.433
There is likewise value, Professor Black emphasized, in insisting that
judges and not just legislatures play a critical role in upholding the protections of the Bill of Rights. “To insist upon generalizing the ‘balancing’ process, and extending it beyond the stage of definition,” Professor
Black wrote, “will tend to force the Court to abdicate its protective role,
under the guise of deference to the legislative branch.”434 Affirming the
significance of constitutional rights and affirming the Court’s role in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
425
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Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960).
See Michael Paris & Kevin J. McMahon, Absolutism and Democracy: Hugo L. Black’s Free
Speech Jurisprudence, in JUDGING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE OF
U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 75, 75 (Helen J. Knowles & Steven B. Lichtman eds., 2015) (“The
speech struck some of America’s legal cognoscenti as quaintly naïve, at best.”); see also Charles L.
Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER’S MAG., Feb.
1961, at 63, 63.
427 See Black, supra note 426, at 65.
428 Id. at 67.
429 DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 191.
430 Black, supra note 426, at 66 (emphasis omitted).
431 Id.
432 Id. at 68.
433 Id.
434 Id. at 66–67.
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identifying those rights, both vital to the Court’s safeguarding of its legitimacy, might require some loose talk about the nature and scope of
rights themselves. Rights are not, of course, absolute in a sense of “imagined chemical purity,”435 but Justice Black’s call was not for utopianism but “for a feasible program of thought and action.”436
Judges must persuade citizens that courts are needed and worth listening to. Doing so might at times require them to gloss over the fact
of continuity between their task and the tasks of elected officials and
administrators. At times. At other times, preserving the legitimacy of
courts might require other strategies. Where we “want[ed] to be led” in
the early 1960s, when Justice Black and Professor Black were writing,
might well be different from where we want to be led today. Justice
Black’s lecture centered, in full, on the dangers that motivated the framers of the Bill of Rights, “the ancient evils which forced their ancestors
to flee to this new country” and “the dangers of tyrannical governments”
that they “knew firsthand.”437 Let us grant that many of the dangers to
rights with which a jurist in 1960 might reasonably have been concerned — the apartheid conditions of the Jim Crow South, McCarthyite
Communist purges, kangaroo criminal trials that presaged the revolution in constitutional criminal procedure — amount to the kind of oppression that bears a family resemblance to that with which the framers
were familiar.
We might yet maintain that “tyranny” is simply not at stake in assessing the residual affirmative action program at the University of
Texas at Austin,438 or a law restricting corporate electioneering in the
two months before a general election to funds generated through a political action committee,439 or a measure requiring a trigger lock on long
arms held within the sixty-one square miles of the nation’s capital.440
Whether or not one agrees with laws of this sort, whether or not one
thinks them constitutionally prohibited, they represent the workaday
products of democratic governance. If challenges to these legislative
acts describe paradigmatic rights conflicts, then it is not at all obvious
that we should want to be “led” to the attitude of skepticism toward the
government that Professor Black rightly identifies with rights absolutism.441 Not because government regulation is good as such, but because
we live in a society that we expect, in the first instance, to govern itself.
The judiciary’s role in that setting is to take both government and rights
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seriously. Whether it does so successfully is a reasonable measure of its
legitimacy.
Diffuse public support for courts is notoriously difficult to disaggregate from public support for specific decisions.442 We soldier on, though,
and available data does not support the notion that proportionality jurisprudence delegitimates courts or would necessarily do so in the
United States. A 2011 study by Professors James Gibson and Gregory
Caldeira found, for example, that Americans do not generally subscribe
to the myth of mechanical jurisprudence, and that the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court does not depend on assuming the absence of discretion, so long as judges are principled in exercising it.443
That finding tends to confirm earlier studies suggesting that, across numerous jurisdictions around the globe, knowledge of high courts, and
by assumption, exposure to their standard modes of adjudication, correlates positively with support for them.444 More generally, studies of
diffuse public support for the constitutional or apex courts of jurisdictions that practice proportionality as a matter of course, such as Canada
and Germany, do not report substantial differences from support for the
U.S. Supreme Court among the American public.445
That said, to the degree relative alignment between judicial and political modes of decisionmaking proves disquieting to judicial review,
that is as it should be. If most rights disputes are between parties who
disagree reasonably and in good faith about the reach of constitutional
rights, then most such disputes should be determined through overtly
political processes.446 The insight is continuous with that of Professor
Ely, who argued that judges should intervene when, and to the degree
that, the political process is not deserving of trust.447 He grounded his
view in observations about the process values he believed the U.S.
Constitution protected as a matter of positive law and in the
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institutional capacity of judges, which he associated with regulation of
procedure.448
But generations of political thought and common experience have
demonstrated that the threats to regular political order do not come
solely from the pathologies that Ely, drawing on footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products, identified449: blockages of the channels of
political change or “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”450
Anonymous and diffuse majorities might be unable to form the coalitions or register the intensity of preference needed to capture the attention of legislators.451 National party polarization might nullify the
checks and balances designed to hem in an extreme legislative program
or executive initiative.452 Well-organized lobbyists and wealthy donors
can dominate the legislative agenda out of proportion to their representation in the population. Political actors can simply make errors in
measuring certain social facts or in recognizing their constitutional significance. The presence of these kinds of slippages in representative
politics may not call for the placing of the political process in judicial
receivership,453 but it calls for a kind of qualified vigilance designed to
protect minorities and majorities alike in the exercise of their rights.454
And so transparency is indeed a promise of proportionality.455 Rather than placing our hands on each other’s jugulars, alienating us from
politics or else giving those politics a Schmittian cast, proportionality at
its best helps us to see when a dispute is better resolved through politics
than through juridification. The true risk to the legitimacy of the Court
would be if, sensitive to the political dimensions apparent in its constitutional docket, it were to insist on categorical adjudication or blunt
judicial remedies. The costs in legitimacy are the wages of selfunderstanding.
4. Lower Court Guidance. — The most significant theoretical concern with importing proportionality jurisprudence into U.S. courts stems
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from the nature of the Supreme Court as an apex court within a system
of highly decentralized constitutional jurisdiction.456 It is tempting to
map categorical versus proportionality frameworks onto the two leading
models of constitutional jurisdiction. Both lower federal courts and
state courts in the United States are empowered to engage in federal
constitutional review. This decentralized jurisdiction proceeds from the
Marbury v. Madison457 conception of judicial review: courts must follow
the law, including the Constitution, and so they must resolve any inconsistency between ordinary and constitutional law that arises in the
course of adjudication.458 By contrast, under the Kelsenian model dominant in Europe, a specially created constitutional court holds exclusive
constitutional jurisdiction.459 Insofar as proportionality relies heavily
on case-by-case adjudication, it gives less guidance to other courts, public officials, and citizens than does a categorical approach.
Lack of guidance, to lower courts especially, is a more serious problem in a system of decentralized constitutional jurisdiction than in one
with a centralized constitutional court. We might think the problem
more serious still in a federal system, in which relatively uniform federal
law is the glue that holds the legal system together. Indeed, the felt need
to establish uniform federal law is perhaps the most compelling justification for the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state
courts,460 and it remains the leading motivation behind the Court’s certiorari decisions.461
This criticism of proportionality is genuine. Even on the least generous view of categorical adjudication, one that sees the categories as
weak approximations that distort constitutional law, the approach
would retain the benefit of promoting uniformity in the law. Recall that
that’s the problem. The more rule-like and unforgiving the doctrinal
formulation, the greater the error in subsuming cases the rule does not
contemplate and the better the law is able to promote uniformity. Uniformity in the law relates positively to the kinds of distortions this
Foreword singles out as problematic.
Uniformity, while holding some clear benefits, is neither a trump nor
even an unvarnished good, however. Where federal law is certain, “Our
Federalism” seems to require that it be consistent across states.462 But
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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where federal law is uncertain, it is not obvious, a priori, that some variation in the law across states is undesirable. Such variation offers the
usual benefits of legal pluralism. It can provide data about the consequences or workability of a particular approach to rights, permitting
states or federal circuits to provide the laboratories of innovation that
are sometimes said to motivate federalism in the first instance.463
Relatedly, the Supreme Court tolerates significant disuniformity in
the law.464 Although its rules for certiorari suggest a concern with divisions of authority among lower courts, it is common for the Court to
allow circuit splits to “percolate” until multiple courts have weighed in
on the merits in published opinions that can inform the Court’s reasoning.465 The Court’s docket has conspicuously shrunk from routinely
reaching over 150 cases in the 1980s to fewer than half that number
today.466 The Court heard arguments in just sixty-three cases in the
2017 Term,467 fewer than in either of the previous two Terms.468
It is, in any event, easy to overstate the disuniformity proportionality
invites. Proportionality is fully consistent with a devotion to precedent,
indeed with a dogged insistence that courts be less casual about the level
of generality with which they approach prior cases. It better approximates the common law method than does the categorical frame, for it
makes relevant the kinds of comparative factual assessments that motivate common law reasoning; like cases are to be treated alike and different cases are to be treated differently.469 It is telling that the Supreme
Court of Canada is an apex court in a federal system with decentralized
constitutional jurisdiction that employs proportionality analysis with no
apparent crisis of disuniformity in federal constitutional law.470
More broadly, over time, through constant exposure to the lived experience of constitutional law, we can expect substantial convergence
between the categorical and proportionality approaches. Treating like
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cases alike gives rise to evidentiary presumptions and rules of thumb
that calcify into an array of ex ante categories. From the opposite direction, applying ex ante categories to real rather than hypothesized
facts tends to birth the exceptions, and the exceptions to the exceptions,
that are familiar, for example, from First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Every system combines elements of both categoricalism and
more ex post approaches. We can expect proportionality to reach inductively in the direction categoricalism aims for deductively.471
What happens in the long meantime matters. For one thing, building
out rights inductively reflects a humility about judges’ capacity for
knowledge and forethought that is appropriate in a complex regulatory
environment. For another, and following Professor Black, the perspective from which the convergence begins affects the attitude that courts
and legal and political elites take toward the constitutional system. Is
the baseline attitude that governments are constituted to solve social
problems so long as they do so reasonably, or is it that rights are implemented to limit government, unless government is necessary? The latter
view indeed takes rights seriously, but it thereby encourages judges to
limit the definition of rights just for the sake of limits rather than in
response to actual facts about the world.
All of which is to say that the costs of proportionality, in departing
from interpretivism, in forcing judges to resolve values conflicts, in fostering legal uncertainty, are simply the costs of judicial review. Those
costs can be obscured out of anxiety over the court’s legitimacy, they
can be assessed and mitigated forthrightly, or we can abandon judicial
review.
IV. THE CONTINGENT ORIGINS OF RIGHTS AS TRUMPS
In a November 1964 essay published in Harper’s, the historian
Richard Hofstadter told Americans they were paranoid. “American
politics,” he began, “has often been an arena for angry minds.”472 The
essay, later published as part of an influential book,473 identified in U.S.
politics across the political spectrum what Hofstadter called a “sense of
heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”474 that
he traced anecdotally across abolitionists, Know Nothings, the anti-
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Masonry movement, McCarthyites, and “both sides of the race controversy” of the 1960s.475 Hofstadter’s casual conflation of, say, White
Citizens’ Councils and Black Muslims,476 the paranoia of the oppressor
and that of the oppressed, less discredits Hofstadter than it reveals the
truth in the old adage that just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean
they aren’t out to get you.
Americans had a fair amount to be paranoid about in the fall of 1964.
Hofstadter was writing in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
apex of the Cold War and its attendant existential threat.477 President
Kennedy had been assassinated, no telling by whom exactly, a year before Hofstadter’s essay. Less than two decades had passed since the fall
of the Axis powers. The Second World War had not only killed some
seventy million people, including more than 400,000 Americans,478 but
it had been perpetrated by a regime that was somehow able to mobilize
millions to participate in an ideologically motivated project of world
domination and ethnoreligious genocide. The Nazi puzzle prompted the
Frankfurt School sociologist Theodor Adorno and his coauthors to seek
to identify the roots of what they called the “potentially fascistic individual.”479 Their Freudian conclusion that such a personality could
develop out of the kind of “hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitive parentchild relationship”480 with which many Americans could identify, and
that a fascist-in-waiting could be activated through a brew of propaganda and economic self-interest,481 was downright terrifying.482
Black and brown Americans had special reason for both anxiety
and hope. Jim Crow was under assault — both the Republican and
Democratic national convention platforms included antisegregation
planks in 1960483 — but it remained resilient.484 Freedom Summer had
just come and gone, and with it the beatings and murders of at least
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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seven civil rights workers and their supporters in Mississippi. The Civil
Rights Act passed in the middle of that summer, but its reach and enforceability remained uncertain. Brown v. Board of Education was a
decade old, but in 1964 only 30,800 of the 2.9 million black schoolchildren in the eleven states of the Deep South attended a school with any
white classmates.485 Millions of southern blacks remained disenfranchised. Mississippi had been chosen as the site for Freedom Summer
because, through discriminatory practices and intimidation, only 6.7%
of its black voting-age population was registered to vote, as opposed to
70.2% of white voting-age citizens.486
The criminal justice system remained authoritarian and deeply racist. Many of the constitutional protections we associate with the Warren
Court — Miranda’s487 bar on admissions of confessions obtained
without an enumeration of the defendant’s rights against selfincrimination,488 Brady’s489 requirement that prosecutors disclose exculpatory evidence in their possession,490 Gideon’s491 assurance that
indigent state criminal defendants have a right to appointed counsel,492
and more — had not yet materialized. The Criminal Justice Act of
1964,493 which paved the way for a federal public defender system, had
only just been passed. Blacks were disproportionate victims of police
brutality, a major impetus for the Watts riots that terrorized Los Angeles
five days after the Voting Rights Act was signed into law.
A. Griswold, Lochner, and the Right to Privacy
The fragile state of the world as it looked through the eyes of many
Americans in the mid-1960s provides important context for the pivotal
jurisprudential choices that U.S. judges and lawyers would make over
the decade that followed the publication of Hofstadter’s essay. The decade that began with the Civil Rights Act, which effectively ended Jim
Crow, would also see the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, which
fundamentally reoriented U.S. politics; second-wave feminism and the
emergence of the modern women’s movement; the sexual revolution,
which resulted in wholesale changes in public morality around sex and
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the family; and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,494 which
shifted the demographics of U.S. migration by abolishing statutory preferences for Western Europeans. It was also in 1964 that Charles Reich
published The New Property,495 identifying the many ways in which
individual flourishing depended (newly, so to speak) on government largesse — from social welfare to government employment, contracts, and
licensing — which exerted tremendous pressure on traditional boundaries of public and private, and of rights and privileges.496
The flowering of rights that characterized the era did not just respond to anxiety but also produced it. The American constitutional imagination had never before been so vivid or so threatening. In a flash,
and almost simultaneously, appeared the very real possibilities of constitutional rights to substantive racial and sexual equality, to undiluted
voting and unprecedented judicial supervision of electoral mechanics,
to a degree of economic equality and public welfare, to abortion on request, and to restrained interactions with police and prosecutors. The
forms of oppression and the levers of inequality that Americans had
come to associate with ordinary governance were under assault. It was
the enlightened despotism of the Rechtsstaat.
And so consider Griswold v. Connecticut,497 which came down in
June 1965. To understand its significance to modern constitutional
law — and its role in seeding the categorical frame — requires a reckoning with what the Griswold majority sought to avoid: Lochner v. New
York.498
In Lochner, the Supreme Court invalidated a unanimously passed
New York law that regulated the working hours of bakers, on the
ground that it unduly interfered with the bakers’ and bakeries’ freedom
of contract.499 In broad brushstrokes, at least two criticisms of Lochner
have emerged. On one view, the problem is that, in protecting the right
to freedom of contract, which the Constitution does not specifically enumerate, the majority read its own politicized views of healthy economic
life — Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics and all that — into our
higher law.500 This criticism aligns roughly with the dissenting opinion
of Justice Holmes.501 On another view, the problem was not any exalted
status granted the freedom of contract (which was well established502)
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but rather the Court’s insufficient respect for the government’s justifications for the law, which were grounded in the apparent health and
safety dangers of bakery work.503 This criticism aligns roughly with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan.504
Returning to Professor Black’s useful provocation, the Holmes and
Harlan critiques of Lochner adopt different attitudes toward the New
York Bakeshop Act. Justice Holmes barely mentioned the statute or its
aims; that they did not concern him was just the point.505 Reflecting
Justice Holmes’s own (somewhat ironic) social Darwinism,506 his opinion announces a theory of jurisprudence:
[T]he word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.507

By contrast, Justice Harlan’s opinion “[g]rant[s]” that “there is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated even under the sanction of
direct legislative enactment.”508 His focus was not on constitutional theory or the identification of constitutional rights but rather on a workaday inquiry that combined empirical assessment with qualitative judgment: “[W]hether the means devised by the State are germane to an end
which may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial relation to the protection of health, as involved in the daily work of the
persons . . . engaged in bakery and confectionery establishments.”509
The Brandeis Brief was yet a twinkle in Louis Brandeis’s eye, but
there was Justice Harlan in Lochner basing his analysis in part on
German doctor Ludwig Hirt’s 1871 treatise calling the work of bakers
“among the hardest and most laborious imaginable” and quoting another author’s conclusions that “[t]he constant inhaling of flour dust
causes inflammation of the lungs and of the bronchial tubes,” the long
hours bakers work “produce rheumatism, cramps and swollen legs,” and
“[n]early all bakers are pale-faced and of more delicate health than the
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workers of other crafts.”510 Justice Harlan’s dissent also cited statistics
showing that the average daily working time was shorter than the
Bakeshop Act’s ceiling in a number of Western countries and cited findings in a New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor report that endorsed
shorter work hours and noted that bakers in particular are exposed to
“conditions that interfere with nutrition.”511 The attitude that this opinion enabled is one of not just deference to the legislature but basic respect for its work in seeking to address a social problem.
When the Court abandoned Lochner and related cases in 1937, it
implicitly adopted the Holmes rather than the Harlan critique.512 The
most succinct statement of the new rights regime appears in Carolene
Products and footnote four. Justice Stone appended the footnote to his
statement that “legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”513 Footnote four then
pitches three categorical exceptions to the rational basis standard:
specifically enumerated constitutional rights, laws restricting the
process of political change, and laws directed at “discrete and insular
minorities.”514
This statement and footnote are the prototype for the tiers-ofscrutiny framework515: a law is upheld against a rights attack if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest unless the right asserted
falls into a protected category, delimited ex ante. Importantly, the rational basis test may rely on hypothetical motivations,516 betraying its
notional premise that what drives the constitutional inquiry is not the
nature of the social problem the legislature seeks to address but rather,
and predominantly, the decontextualized nature of the right infringed.
The Court, like Justice Holmes, does not care about a statute’s substance
except in those presumptively rare instances in which the legislature’s
brazen violation of the Bill of Rights, political self-dealing, or racial or
religious bigotry is, for some peculiar reason, justified.517
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There is no reason to treat this categorical regime as specially tied to
American history or enduring values. The Lochner era was, after all,
many decades long and it was in important ways continuous with prior
periods.518 In the waning days of the Great Depression, as President
Franklin D. Roosevelt began his second term and his third New Deal,519
with the top federal income tax rate approaching eighty percent,520 and
on the eve of the Second World War, the paradigmatic mischief to which
the Fourteenth Amendment was directed seemed more obviously to be
racial and religious discrimination and infringements on political
speech, not economic regulation. The Lochner-era regime was believed
to be an obvious failure,521 and Carolene Products reflected reasonable
views about the unfinished business of U.S. constitutional law. That
unfinished business would require the Court to confront the systemwide pathologies that Jim Crow, religious bias, and red-baiting reflected.
The contrast with the Lochner era, in which the Court self-consciously
second-guessed particularized legislative judgments about economic
policy, made it easy to essentialize pathology as what constitutional law
was rightly about.
More broadly, Carolene Products conspicuously, and artificially, segregated the race question from questions of political economy. Leaving
the government free to pursue “social and economic” measures but not
those that target racial minorities incompletely theorizes what social and
economic regulation might entail. Carolene Products itself suppressed
the right of a business to enter a market,522 and the roughly contemporaneous decision in United States v. Darby523 suppressed a right to contract that would have prevented wage and hour legislation.524 But the
Carolene Products regime was on its own terms indifferent to whether
the rights suppressed in the future were, for example, rights to welfare,
to education, to unionization, or to collective bargaining, including contractual rights that can preserve a union’s gains.525 And secondgeneration claims by racial and religious minorities are not easily distinguished, a priori, from claims to social or economic justice advanced by
others. And so in cases like Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
518
519

See Fallon, supra note 128, at 1285–86.
See John W. Jeffries, A “Third New Deal”?: Liberal Policy and the American State, 1937–
1945, 8 J. POL’Y HIST. 387, 387 (1996).
520 MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION,
1933–1939, at 91 (1984).
521 Fallon, supra note 128, at 1287.
522 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
523 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
524 Id. at 125–26.
525 See Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
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and Employment Division v. Smith, it appeared to the Court that it
could not give an inch without giving a mile.
Consider Griswold, then, in this light. By 1965, the Court had come
to define its mandate in significant part through Brown and southern
efforts to resist desegregation. Even its most significant freedom of
speech case of the decade, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,526 may be
viewed as an effort to arm civil rights advocates to resist southern juries.527 But Griswold seemed not to involve any of the Carolene
Products categories. The right to use birth control was not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. It did not in any obvious way implicate
channels of political change.528 And the women burdened by laws regulating birth control were neither discrete and insular nor, as such, members of a minority group.529 The options available to the Griswold Court
were at least three,530 and they mirrored those available to the Lochner
Court. The Court could uphold the Connecticut law, as Justices Black
and Stewart urged.531 It could carefully weigh the State’s moral (or
whatever other) interest in banning contraceptives against basic freedoms of marital privacy and reproductive autonomy — both simply applications of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause — and
strike the law down. Justice Harlan would have so held, conjuring his
grandfather.532 Or, the Court could invalidate the law by creating a new
category, privacy, in effect the forgotten fourth paragraph of Carolene
Products.
The first option — abdication — ran contrary to the political winds,
the constitutional instincts of seven members of the Griswold Court, and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
526
527

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See, e.g., Anders Walker, “Neutral” Principles: Rethinking the Legal History of Civil Rights,
1934–1964, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 385, 427–30 (2009).
528 It did so indirectly by restricting the ability of women to participate in civic life. See Neil S.
Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J.F. 349, 355–56 (2015).
529 Women as a class of course faced significant disadvantages that the Connecticut law reflected,
see id. at 353–54, and the fact that birth control restrictions were far more likely to be enforced
against clinics and to affect poor women meant that Griswold was shot through with class issues,
see Cary Franklin, Griswold and the Public Dimension of the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J.F.
332, 335–37 (2015).
530 The Court also could have taken a different doctrinal route and invalidated the law under
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. The former ground would have relied on the
Court’s nascent freedom of association cases. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–66 (1958);
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF ROE V. WADE 245–46 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1998) (1994) (describing Justice Douglas’s first draft
of the Griswold decision, which would have decided the case on the basis of freedom of association).
The latter might have relied on unfairness to the poor women served by Griswold’s clinic, along
the lines suggested by John Hart Ely, Chief Justice Warren’s law clerk on the case. See GARROW,
supra, at 237.
531 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 528–29
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
532 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541–45, 549–54 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (incorporating Poe dissent by reference).
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the personal views of all nine.533 As Justice Harlan emphasized in a
related case, the Connecticut law was unusually obnoxious in outlawing
the use of contraceptives as opposed to simply their distribution.534
Contraceptives were used, in some cases, to prevent lifethreatening pregnancies,535 and so the law seemed at least problematic — and substantive due process therefore viable — as applied to
those cases.536 The law was virtually unenforceable and was triggered
in the case itself only because of Estelle Griswold’s calculated effort to
have herself arrested.537 A 1962 Gallup poll found that seventy-two
percent of respondents, and fifty-six percent of Roman Catholics, favored birth control information being openly available.538 The Griswold
case was an effect, not a cause, of the sexual revolution; it was scarcely
imaginable, still less in retrospect, that the Warren Court would have
upheld the law.
The second option, to conceive of the right at stake as simply an
aspect of constitutionally protected liberty and balance it against the
State’s interest, rushed headlong into Lochner. Without creating an additional and sharply delineated category, the Court could distinguish
Lochner only on its facts. But having the Court distinguish valid from
invalid statutes solely on the facts was itself the discredited Lochner
approach. Viewing Lochner and Griswold through a proportionality
lens could have illuminated a distinction that, familiar as the cases are,
the received wisdom obscures. The conventional narrative of Lochner
is that no rights were at issue. There is no right to contract, and so,
following Justice Holmes, the legislature should be free to pursue its
interests, themselves uninteresting to the Constitution or the Court. But
the Bakeshop Act might better be understood as creating a conflict of
rights. Bakers had not merely an interest in but a right to safe, healthy
working conditions, a right protected through legislation rather than juridification. Bakery owners and dissenting bakers also had rights to
contract that entitled them to the attention of a constitutional court.
The Court’s job was to sort out whether the statute was justified in light
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
533 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (majority opinion); id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id.
at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 506–07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
534 Poe, 367 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
535 This was the set-up of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497. See Oral Argument at 1:25:21, Poe, 367
U.S. 497 (No. 60), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1960/60 [https://perma.cc/MTD4-5KV6] (Justice
Stewart: “[I]t’s like permitting a doctor to tell a patient that he has appendicitis, if he doesn’t have
it removed, he’s going to die, but — but they’re not allowing . . . any surgeon to remove the appendix, isn’t it?”).
536 See GARROW, supra note 530, at 176 (quoting a memo from Richard Arnold, Justice
Brennan’s law clerk, arguing that the possibility of “physical harm and possible death” meant the
law could not be applied to medically indicated birth control).
537 See id. at 201–07.
538 Id. at 216.
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of those contractual rights, a task to which the rights dimensions of the
law should have been relevant but weren’t.539 It is far more difficult to
conceive of the Connecticut birth control law as sounding in rights, and
that should matter to a reviewing court.
The influence of legal process thinking likely helped doom this kind
of approach in Griswold. Legal process emphasizes acoustic separation
between the roles of judges and of legislatures. As Ely once put it, legal
process scholars share the “starting assumption that those who would
justify judicial invalidation of legislation must do so on the basis of some
characteristic that courts possess in greater measure than ordinary political officials.”540 Embedded within legal process theory is a view of
the Court’s role that is continuous with the fundamentally private law
vision of judicial review handed down from Chief Justice Marshall in
Marbury.541 On this view, judges are on firmest ground when they are
interpreting legal documents using modes of analysis that transparently
limit their discretion. Modern, stepwise proportionality analysis is not
necessarily inconsistent with legal process and indeed shares its emphasis on case-by-case adjudication, but the open-ended balancing of
Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman542 dissent was less than edifying.543 Indeed, as a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren the Term Griswold was
decided, Ely told his boss that “Harlan’s opinion in Poe boils down to a
statement that he does not like the Conn[ecticut] law. This vague, ‘outrage’ approach to the 14th Amendment comprises, in my opinion, the
most dangerous sort of ‘activism.’”544
The third option available to the Griswold Court — to create a new
category for heightened scrutiny around the fundamental right to privacy — ultimately commanded a Court.545 The difference between an
approach that exalted the right to privacy as a distinct category and one
that, like Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent, saw it as simply one aspect of
liberty, was not merely rhetorical. Those made anxious by the flowering
of rights in the 1960s could find more comfort in a categorical
approach that appeared to exclude downstream consequences considered troublesome.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
539 It would also have been relevant to a proportionality analysis whether the law was indeed
motivated, as Professor David Bernstein has suggested, by a wish to harm the economic interests
of immigrant bakers rather than a (non-exclusive) desire to protect the working conditions of bakers.
See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 26, 33 (2011).
540 John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 834 n.4 (1991).
541 See Greene, supra note 265, at 48–49.
542 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
543 See ELY, supra note 47, at 60–61.
544 GARROW, supra note 530, at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting Ely’s bench memo to Chief
Justice Warren in Griswold).
545 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965); id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Consider, for example, Chief Justice Warren, who was uneasy with
Griswold from the start of the case and indeed before, when it came to
the Court in the guise of Poe.546 He confided in Ely after oral argument,
and later told his colleagues at conference, that he could not “say the
state has no legitimate interest” (as Justice White would argue in his
separate concurrence547) because it would “lead me to trouble on abortions.”548 He also could not “balance the interest of the state against
that of the individual,” nor could he “use the substantive due process
approach,” nor did he “believe the equal protection argument [was]
sound,” nor did he “accept the privacy argument.”549 After initially joining Justice White’s opinion550 — which he thought would be difficult to
reconcile with abortion restrictions — he ultimately joined Justice
Goldberg’s concurrence to give Justice Douglas a majority.551
Griswold’s sprint away from Lochner’s methodology complicated the
constitutional law that would follow. Abortion is the most conspicuous
area in which it might matter whether a right to privacy is itself fundamental or is instead an application of less well-defined liberty interests.
To speak of abortion as a private matter begs the question, for many
abortion rights opponents see it as filicide. The law sometimes regards
the killing of others as justified or excused, as for example in war, in
self-defense, or in defense of others; U.S. law also generally grants laypersons a right to allow others to die even if we were uniquely situated
to save their lives.552 We can therefore speak of one’s liberty to abort a
fetus without violating the conditions of public reason.553 It is more
difficult to hold such a conversation in the language of privacy, for one
side simply rejects the premise. As noted, the privacy rights frame led
Justice Blackmun to the otherwise unnecessary provocation that fetuses
were not constitutional persons.
Abortion is the leading example but not the only one. As social understandings of rights broadened in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court faced
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
546 Chief Justice Warren began the conference by saying the Court could not invalidate the
Connecticut law on its face because it would mean a return to the abandoned substantive due
process of the Lochner era. GARROW, supra note 530, at 181.
547 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505–06 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
548 GARROW, supra note 530, at 240.
549 Id. at 240–41.
550 See id. at 251–52.
551 Justice Goldberg’s opinion stated that it joined Justice Douglas’s opinion. Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
552 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.05 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV.
1447, 1452 (2008).
553 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–13, 217 (1993); see also John Finnis, Commensuration and Public Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 215 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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recurrences of the choices discussed above: rejection of the right outright, balancing, or trying to work within modular categories. And rather than feel empowered to confront a world of heretofore audacious
claims to gender equality, social welfare, equal public education, “reverse” racial discrimination, disparate impact, vote dilution, and intimate freedom for sexual minorities with care and attention to context,
the Court repeatedly has rested on ex ante categories.
Thus, in Rodriguez, the Court considered not whether an important
entitlement was being arbitrarily rationed but whether, as an interpretive matter, “there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”554 In Bowers v. Hardwick,555 upholding
Georgia’s anti-sodomy law,556 and Washington v. Glucksberg,557 upholding the State’s ban on assisted suicide,558 the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions fought incommensurably about the appropriate level
of generality at which to assess a right’s connection to U.S. traditions
rather than arguing commensurably about the State’s justifications for
obvious limits on autonomy.559 Affirmative action opinions try to cram
an obvious remedial measure aimed at a genuine social problem into the
ill-fitting, stylized box of strict scrutiny. The dissents cry bad faith,560
and they have a point.
Nor is the rights-as-trumps response simply the epiphenomenon for
the ascendancy of conservative judicial politics. Justice Black, the ne
plus ultra of judicial absolutists, was politically liberal. In Keyes v.
School District No. 1,561 the Denver school desegregation case, it was
the conservative Justice Powell who pushed for an approach more akin
to proportionality while Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, fearing
the pathology of separate but equal, embraced the formalistic distinction
between de jure and de facto segregation.562 We can assume that, to the
degree the courts are becoming more conservative, any methodology is
going to be used to reach more conservative results on the margins. It
follows that any effort to resist that methodology will be accused of
seeking more progressive outcomes — some readers no doubt will level
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
554
555
556
557
558
559

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973) (emphasis added).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id. at 189.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 705–06.
Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–93, and Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722–28 (defining the contested right narrowly), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 773–82 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (defining the relevant right more
expansively).
560 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2216 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 366 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
561 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
562 See id. at 213–14; id. at 224–26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra
pp. 51–52.
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the same charge at this Foreword. But categorical adjudication is not
inherently conservative, nor is proportionality inherently progressive.
Either can be used to help or hurt the government, with whatever valence doing so entails.
And so it is not quite right to reject global approaches solely based
on the politics of the U.S. judiciary. But it is instructive to note that
proportionality in its modern form did not develop until the 1960s and
1970s. Indeed, most constitutional courts did not develop their rights
jurisprudence until that era or later. The German Constitutional Court
was established in 1951, and that Court’s initial foray into proportionality dates to the 1958 Pharmacy Case.563 Throughout the 1970s the
German Court, Swiss courts, and the European Court of Justice were
the only courts with well-developed doctrinal proportionality frameworks.564 The adoption of judicially recognized proportionality analysis
in the European Court of Human Rights in the late 1970s and early
1980s served as a catalyst for other Council of Europe jurisdictions.565
Canada’s Supreme Court did not have constitutional jurisdiction in
most rights cases until 1982,566 and Oakes came down in 1986.567 Israel
had no enforceable “constitutional” rights until United Mizrahi Bank
Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village568 was handed down in 1995.569 Most
Latin American and African courts that engage in constitutional rights
review have done so for not much longer.570 While the general idea of
proportionality as justified government has roots in nineteenth-century
German administrative law,571 proportionality doctrine as a technology
of constitutional review is no older than the rights revolution itself.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, constitutional courts in other countries were created with complex public law disputes at the forefront of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
563
564
565
566

7 BVERFGE 377 (Ger.); see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 217, at 670.
See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 236, at 103 n.79, 148.
Id. at 148.
The Constitution Act of 1982 declares the Canadian Constitution to be the supreme law. Part
VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). The
Charter is part of the Constitution Act. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 § 2 (U.K.).
567 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
568 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 (1995)
(Isr.).
569 Id. Israel does not have a written constitution, but the United Mizrahi Bank case enabled
judicial review of ordinary statutes for conformity with certain of the country’s Basic Laws. See
id. at 5.
570 See Joseph M. Isanga, African Judicial Review, the Use of Comparative African Jurisprudence, and the Judicialization of Politics, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 749, 751 (2017); Rodrigo
Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1601 (2011).
571 COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 28, at 24–32; Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 236,
at 97.
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their jurisdiction,572 with relative transparency about the range of
claims sounding in rights that litigants might advance.573 The U.S.
Supreme Court had a nearly 200-year-old well of inertia, with the baggage of the Lochner era slowing its march toward modern adjudication.
The Second World War, moreover, had been predicated on a genuine
crisis in rights recognition. European constitutional and human rights
courts built from the ashes of that conflict were likely better primed to
match their rights jurisprudence to the lived experience of litigants. Proportionality’s promise is that few claims are wholly beneath
constitutional concern, a message that the German Court and others
have explicitly, indeed solemnly, endorsed.574 Americans took a very
different lesson from the war, one that reinforced beliefs about the exceptional strength of American institutions.575 All of which is not to say
that the categorical approach is determined but rather that change will
require a shift, so to speak, in attitude.
B. Rights at the Founding
Rights as trumps is not an American birthright. It is fair to say that
the U.S. political culture tends to be more classically liberal-minded than
many of its counterparts around the world. But that orientation bears
less responsibility for the rights-as-trumps ideology than we might suppose. At a minimum, it is difficult to locate the ideology in the U.S.
Founding-era history. There is plenty of evidence that citizens of the
Founding generation would see modern Canada as more closely approximating their vision of rights recognition and enforcement than the
United States. That proposition is at best an incomplete argument
against rights as trumps on the merits, but it tends to refute the view
that the ideology of rights absolutism is an inheritance from Madison or
is otherwise baked into the Constitution.
Originalists have stressed the many ways in which the Warren and
Burger Courts departed from Founding-era expectations about the substance of constitutional rights.576 They have been less vocal about the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
572
573
574

See STONE SWEET, supra note 459, at 37–38.
Id. at 40–41, 42–43.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, http://www.servat.
unibe.ch/dfr/bv039001.html [https://perma.cc/FZV5-8PH5] (Ger.), translated in Robert E. Jonas &
John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976).
575 See Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1971, 1985–86 (2004).
576 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 338–39 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 69–74, 101, 169–70 (1990).
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ways in which those Courts also departed from Founding-era expectations about how rights disputes would be resolved. There is now a
decades-long debate over the degree to which the lawyers of that age
were themselves originalist or would have expected constitutional interpretation to be originalist as well.577 This focus reflects the U.S. fixation
on rights adjudication as an interpretive exercise. The literature is by
comparison razor thin on the crucial questions of what Founding-era
lawyers would have thought infringement of a right entailed and how it
should be remedied. And yet the symbiosis between rights absolutism
and rights definition that section III.E.3 observed in Justice Black’s position runs in both directions: what the Founders thought citizens had a
right to do is intelligible only if we know what they thought followed
from that right.
Two crucial differences between rights understandings of that era
and our own confound this historical inquiry. First, modern Americans
associate rights reflexively with adjudication, whereas citizens of the
Founding generation associated them with political representation. Second, and relatedly, the rights recognized in the modern Constitution typically apply against all levels of government, whereas the Bill of Rights
was primarily a federalism measure designed to protect state representative institutions — juries most prominently — from federal encroachment. No constructive discussion of rights at the Founding can ignore
either of those factors.
1. Rights as Representation. — The American colonists were British
subjects who inherited British understandings of rights. The central
feature of British constitutionalism was parliamentary sovereignty, what
Professor Jack Rakove calls “the single most profound consequence of
the Glorious Revolution.”578 Within the British tradition, rights were
secured through representation in the legislature and on juries, not
through judicial review of legislation, which would have put subjects’
rights in the hands of the King’s judges.579 The 1689 Declaration of
Rights was accordingly directed at the Crown, on behalf of rather than
in opposition to the legislature.580
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
577 Compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 915–23 (1985) (arguing that the framers did not believe “original intent,” as the term is
currently used, was an appropriate interpretive tool), with John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758–80 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted using the interpretive tools used by the Founders).
578 JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS 33 (1998).
579 Id.
580 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the
Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. (Eng.), reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 41, 41–45;
see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 272
(1969).
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The colonists broke from that tradition, of course, but not cleanly.
The Declaration of Independence famously announces the “self-evident”
truths of the “unalienable” rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness,” but it crucially adds “[t]hat to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.”581 Eight of the eleven states that drafted new
constitutions in the early years of independence included declarations or
bills of rights.582 But like in the Declaration of Independence, the liberties asserted were inseparable from the representative institutions meant
to enforce them. As Gordon Wood writes of the state constitutions, “the
American legislatures in the seventies and eighties . . . acted as the principal interpreters of the fundamental laws they sat under.”583
As foxes guarding henhouses will, state legislatures frequently succumbed to the temptation to act with functional impunity, and their
susceptibility to overreaching and factional capture was a significant
motivation behind the Philadelphia Convention.584 The U.S. constitutional response to legislative abuses of power was not, however, judicial
review, but rather checks and balances.585 “Judges were historically regarded not as independent arbiters of justice but as agents (even lackeys)
of the executive branch,” Rakove writes. To imagine a special judicial
role in enforcing a bill of rights “thus anticipated the new enlarged role
that this third branch of government would now come to play. It was
in fact a prediction of the course that American constitutionalism would
take, not a description of its initial status.”586
The historical relationship between legislatures and bills of rights
puts into perspective James Madison’s well-known description of bills
of rights as “parchment barriers.”587 Madison did not believe that a bill
of rights had much to say to “interested majorities,” who would always
act to promote those interests.588 Indeed, although he believed that
judges would play a role in enforcing the Bill of Rights against the federal government,589 part of Madison’s defense of the view that a national
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
581 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 97–98 (2017) (book
review) (explaining that a representative government could still pass laws implicating “unalienable”
rights per a theory of social contract).
582 RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 36.
583 WOOD, supra note 580, at 274.
584 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 353–57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
585 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
586 RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 164.
587 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 295, 297–300 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
588 Id.
589 James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 196, 206–07 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (“If they are incorporated into
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Bill of Rights might be enforceable in a way that state declarations were
not was that state legislatures, as “sure guardians of the people’s liberty,”
would hold the national government’s feet to the fire.590
In coming around to the utility of the Bill of Rights, Madison put
forward two central rationales. First, articulating the aspirational values of the people helps them to internalize those values over time.591
Second, when in unusual cases the government oppression emerges
independent of the majority will, “a bill of rights will be a good ground
for an appeal to the sense of the community.”592 For Madison, what
separated a popular government from a monarchy was that in the former, “the political and physical power . . . [are] vested in the same hands,
that is in a majority of the people.”593 The structural checks Madison
envisioned would make it difficult for oppressive majorities to control
too many levers of government, but he viewed the Bill of Rights as —
if anything — congenial to rather than an obstacle to the majority
community.
It is crucial, of course, to distinguish the majority as represented in
legislatures from the administration. As noted, the sense that rights
were good as against the King was a crucial inheritance of the Glorious
Revolution. But the mode of representation that would best resist the
Executive was less the legislature than the jury, which the Founding
generation saw as an essential vehicle for articulating the rights of the
community.594 “In these two powers consist wholly, the liberty and security of the people,” John Adams wrote of voting for the legislature and
of trial by jury. “They have no other fortification against wanton, cruel
power: no other indemnification against being ridden like horses, fleeced
like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and cloathed like swine and
hounds: No other defence against fines, imprisonments, whipping posts,
gibbets, bastenadoes and racks.”595
Adams was writing in 1766, against the Stamp Act, but the view of
juries as bound up crucially with rights recognition and enforcement
motivated the Bill of Rights.596 In criticizing the 1787 Constitution, the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights . . . .”).
590 Id. at 207.
591 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 587, at 297.
592 Id.
593 Id.
594 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 48–52 (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due
Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 528 (1970) (“As a bearer of majority sentiments, the jury served as
a powerful and effective vehicle for preventing governmental repression of majority views.”).
595 John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOS. GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Jan.
27, 1766, reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 55, 60.
596 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83–84 (1998).
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influential antifederalist Federal Farmer called the jury trial and legislative representation “the wisest and most fit means of protecting [the
people] in the community.”597 Jurors were drawn from that very
community and had vast powers of investigation, via the grand jury,
and adjudication, via the petit jury.598 As Professor Akhil Reed Amar
emphasizes, jury service was commonly viewed as analogous to service
in the legislature itself.599
2. Rights as Federalism. — Viewing the Bill of Rights through an
eighteenth-century lens illuminates its focus on institutional form.
A remarkable number of its amendments seek to preserve the role
of the jury and other local representative institutions in federal
administration.600
There is the obvious language of the Fifth Amendment grand jury
requirement,601 the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial guarantee and
its accompanying vicinage command,602 and the Seventh Amendment
right to a civil jury and preservation of that jury’s factfinding.603 But
consider as well that the First Amendment was initially understood primarily as a restriction on prior restraints.604 Prior restraints were more
problematic than speech infringements enforced through ex post liability
because licensing fell within the purview of executive rather than judicial processes, and so the jury was cut out of determining the underlying
validity of the regulation.605 The Second Amendment protected militias — another form of local rights enforcement606 — from disarmament
at the hands of the federal government.607 The Fourth Amendment’s
reference to “unreasonable” searches and seizures put a classic jury question at the heart of its protections and erected an obstacle — a warrant
requirement and the probable cause standard — to searches justified ex
ante before judges.608 The Fifth Amendment protected the petit jury’s
judgment via the Double Jeopardy Clause.609 The Eighth Amendment
aimed to restrict federal judges who might depart from community sentencing standards.610
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
597 Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter IV (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 250 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
598 AMAR, supra note 596, at 85.
599 See id. at 94–96.
600 See id. at 96.
601 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
602 See id. amend. VI.
603 See id. amend. VII.
604 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 168–70 (1985).
605 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 23–24.
606 See id. at 46–59.
607 See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
608 See Amar, supra note 38, at 759; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
609 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 96; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
610 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 87; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amar makes the important observation that the origin of the Bill of
Rights in federalism — in the rights of local communities against external or minority usurpation — complicates the incorporation story.611
Collective rights to local self-governance do not seamlessly translate
into individual interests in avoiding oppression from that same selfgovernance. Confusion over the best way to understand the Second
Amendment is most emblematic of this complication, but it applies more
broadly.612 Amar’s solution is to choose whether and how to incorporate
based on which elements of a right were best understood in the 1860s
in private rather than federalism-related terms.613 Whether or not one
accepts Amar’s “refined incorporation,”614 the relevant point for our
purposes is his recognition that this inquiry must be contextual.615
The federalism core of the Bill of Rights might affect not only the
degree to which one believes a right incorporated but also how to adjudicate the right when it arises. It made some sense to say, with Madison,
that “absolute restrictions [on rights] in cases that are doubtful . . . ought
to be avoided” when, as Madison maintained, any such restrictions could
not overcome “the decided sense of the public” in whose name they
speak.616 It might make less sense when, as Dworkin argued, the overriding purpose of identifying a right is to prevent that “decided sense”
from interfering with it. This Foreword has accordingly emphasized
that how a constitutional community adjudicates rights should follow
not from any mysticism about the particular rights at stake or about
rights in general but rather from the paradigmatic forms of mischief the
community wishes to confront. A well-intentioned but shortsighted majority, a minority that has captured policy levers, a local majority outlying from a hierarchically superior majority, and a tyrannical national
majority acting in bad faith all require different forms of intervention
when they infringe rights.
Madison’s reference to “doubtful” cases gestures further at the important distinction between core violations of a right and more marginal
ones. U.S. courts sometimes draw this distinction and sometimes do
not,617 with little or no attention paid to the criteria that should motivate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
611 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 215–16; see also Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment
Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 984–85 (2012).
612 See AMAR, supra note 596, 216–18.
613 See id. at 221.
614 Id. at 218.
615 See id. at 222.
616 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 587, at 297.
617 Compare, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry
into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”), with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340
(2010) (“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or
inadvertence.”).

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD

115

it or that have motivated it in the past. Proportionality analysis necessarily differentiates between big and small rights violations, a sensitivity
that seems precisely appropriate to the Due Process Clause, the doctrinal
avenue U.S. courts use to apply the Bill of Rights and other substantive
rights against state governments.
The word “due” invites a
decisionmaker to calibrate the degree of judicial intervention to the egregiousness, all things considered, of the government’s interference with
liberty.618
These pages are not the place for a comprehensive history of rights
enforcement in the United States. Before leaving this topic, however, it
is well to point out the affinities between Founding-era rights understandings and those characteristic of the proto-proportionality of the
Lochner era. For both Madison and Justice Peckham, the great threat
to liberty was not intentional oppression of discrete and insular minorities but rather factionalism: interested majorities acting for the benefit
of a motivated and resourced minority rather than for the greater
good.619 Nineteenth-century state court decisions repeatedly interpreted
their own state constitutions to prohibit factional legislation,620 not because the particular rights at issue were sacrosanct or absolute but because interference with liberty should be for good reasons. For state
laws, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment, the primary
issue for U.S. courts was not authority but justification.
C. On Facts and Remedies
This Part has emphasized the contingencies that have led the U.S.
culture of rights adjudication to adopt a rights-as-trumps ideology
rather than proportionality. The many ways in which elements of proportionality creep into U.S. law, often sub rosa, suggest that shifting to
proportionality across the board would be less disruptive than it might
seem. Still, two stubborn tendencies of U.S. courts bear mention as lingering obstacles that frustrate proportionality analysis and the reasoning
behind it. First, U.S. courts do not have reliable mechanisms for adjudicating empirical disputes over the facts on which effective proportionality analysis depends. Second, U.S. courts tend to disfavor the kind of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
618 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.”).
619 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 20, 32 (1993).
620 See id. at 49–60; see also, e.g., Franklin Bank v. Cooper, 39 Me. 542 (1855); Portland Bank v.
Apthorp, 12 Mass. (12 Tyng) 252 (1815); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554 (1831);
Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).
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remedial discretion that goes hand in hand with treating cases contextually. This section discusses each in brief, incorporating by reference
more elaborate comments I have offered elsewhere.621
1. Facts. — U.S. courts possess few resources independent of the
parties to gather and evaluate facts.622 The kinds of facts relevant to
constitutional disputes on a proportionality model are those going to the
government’s motivation for a law or practice, the state of the world to
which the government purports to be responding, the availability of alternative means of achieving its ends that are less costly in rights terms,
the law’s policy benefits, and the marginal burden on the rights claimant
and those similarly situated. These are what Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis identified as “legislative” facts,623 those facts that “help the
tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its
judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take.”624
Legislative facts are to be distinguished from adjudicative facts, those
“concerning the immediate parties — who did what, where, when, how,
and with what motive or intent” — that are typically adduced via documentary evidence and witness testimony.625
When a constitutional decision turns on legislative facts, as proportionality urges, those facts become “constitutional facts.”626 Because
they determine the law’s content and not just its application, constitutional facts are appropriately subject to de novo rather than deferential
review by appellate courts.627 The problems with de novo appellate
review of facts in the U.S. system are many, and they become worse at
the Supreme Court. The Court relies on party presentation at the trial
court level to develop the record on appeal. When it wishes to supplement the record — as it does routinely — the Court relies on biased
amici whose claims have not typically been subject to adversarial testing,628 or else it conducts its own research, say at the Mayo Clinic629 or
on the World Wide Web.630 A case ripe for certiorari often has multiple
district court records, developed by parties of varying degrees of sophis-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
621
622

See generally Greene, supra note 265.
See Frederick Schauer, Our Informationally Disabled Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014,
at 105, 111.
623 Legislative facts are sometimes called “social facts.” Borgmann, supra note 265, at 1187.
624 Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955).
625 Id.
626 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 230–31 (1985).
627 Id. at 238–39.
628 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1800–02 (2014).
629 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 82–83 (2005).
630 See William R. Wilkerson, The Emergence of Internet Citations in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 323, 325 (2006).
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tication. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose significant constraints on third-party intervention,631 and the Court itself imposes strict
limits on third-party standing that might permit more knowledgeable
organizations or individuals to help prosecute or defend a case.632 By
contrast, courts born of civil law traditions often rely on an inquisitorial
model that can enable a constitutional court to supplement the record
through independent inquiry.633
It may be that this objection proves too much. The Court’s wanting
approach to legislative facts, though understudied, is pervasive.634
It lingers as a limitation whether the Court adopts proportionality
wholesale or, as now, adopts ad hoc variants or avoids it altogether. To
the degree the Court is unbothered by its current approach to legislative
facts, it might be equally unbothered under proportionality, even if a
few pedants in the academy insist it should be more attentive. That
said, taking this challenge seriously would prompt a reconsideration of
rules of intervention and standing, perhaps a loosening of oral argument
procedures to permit parties or amici to present and respond to evidence,
the increased use of special masters,635 or perhaps even the creation and
use of a judicial research service akin to the one that assists Congress in
developing its own factual record.636
2. Remedies. — In the 2016 case of Zubik v. Burwell,637 a group of
primarily nonprofit organizations sued for religious exemptions from
federal requirements, implementing the Affordable Care Act, that they
provide their employees with health insurance plans that covered certain contraceptives.638 The nonprofits argued that, even though they
could exempt themselves from the requirement by noting their religious
objections on a form submitted to their insurer or to the government,
signing the form would result in their employees receiving coverage and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
631 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (generally limiting intervention to those holding a claim that shares “a
common question of law or fact”).
632 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 127 (2004) (holding that a group of attorneys suing
on behalf of indigent potential clients lacked standing); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)
(per curiam) (holding that a physician did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute that did not affect his Fourteenth Amendment rights, but rather his patients’).
633 See Hughes & MacDonnell, supra note 265, at 40–41 (describing how the German Constitutional Court may use its investigatory powers).
634 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61
DUKE L.J. 1, 43–50 (2011); Borgmann, supra note 265, at 1186–89.
635 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (outlining the existing rules regarding the appointment and
authority of masters).
636 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1986); Gorod, supra note 634,
at 73.
637 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam).
638 Id. at 1559.
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was therefore a religious burden sufficient to trigger the protections of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.639
Rather than award victory to either side in the conflict, the Court
instead acted as a mediator. It requested supplemental briefing on
whether the government could accommodate the organizations.640 Satisfied that the briefing clarified the parties’ amenability to such a solution, the Court remanded to the lower courts to give the parties a chance
“to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered
by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”641 This unusual disposition owes almost certainly to Justice Scalia’s death a few weeks before oral argument. Rather than split 4–4, which seemed reasonably likely at the time,
the Court punted instead.
Bracketing whether this disposition was appropriate in Zubik itself,
the Court could do with more dispositions that offer the parties an opportunity to respond to the Court’s direction or concerns. Thus, the
Court could make use of what is sometimes called a “suspension of invalidity,” a common disposition around the world that gives a period of
time for the government to apply its own fix to a constitutional infirmity
before judicial invalidation of an act.642 The Court itself deployed a
remedy of this sort in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.643 After holding that the scope of jurisdiction Congress
had granted to bankruptcy courts violated Article III,644 the Court suspended its judgment for several months to give Congress a chance to
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts without disrupting ongoing proceedings.645 There, a suspension of invalidity was deemed appropriate because of fear of administrative disorder, but there is good reason for
courts also to suspend invalidity out of deference to the ordinary priority
of political decisionmaking and respect for a complex regulatory scheme
that may be unconstitutional but not invidious.646 A remedy of that sort
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
639 Id.; see also Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427
(3d Cir. 2015).
640 Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1559–60.
641 Id. at 1560 (quoting Supplemental Brief for the Respondents at 1, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No.
14-1418)).
642 See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66
DUKE L.J. 1, 43–58 (2016) (discussing the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s and Supreme
Court of Canada’s discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity in order to allow executive or
legislative intervention).
643 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
644 Id. at 87 (plurality opinion).
645 Id. at 88.
646 The Court in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), cast doubt on
the constitutionality of purely prospective civil remedies in constitutional cases. Id. at 94–99. The
Court potentially could implement suspensions of invalidity by withholding its mandate as needed.
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might have been apt, for example, in Shelby County v. Holder,647 when
the Court gutted the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act
without giving Congress a chance to respond to its opinion with the Act
still in place by, for example, creating a new preclearance formula prior
to the abolition of the old one.648 Or in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, rather than striking down
Seattle’s voluntary school integration plan, the Court could have requested a letter brief proposing a solution to the only constitutional
problem the controlling opinion identified: a too-blunt taxonomy of racial groups.649
The respect for the legislature’s work and the epistemic modesty implicit in a suspension of invalidity fits proportionality’s governing assumption that, in the usual case, a constitutional rights problem results
from reasonable disagreement about the scope of rights rather than from
bad faith or from willful denial of equal citizenship. The legislature has
not just an interest in but a right to address social problems in the first
instance, a right that it should not relinquish simply because five
judges think it got things wrong. On the flip side, proportionality in the
absence of remedial flexibility tends to replicate, and even exacerbate,
one of the pathologies of rights absolutism. When rights are trumps,
constitutional validity can turn on a contested interpretive judgment
that flattens a rich set of empirical questions and normative judgments
into a dull heuristic. Proportionality analysis is more sensitive to the
complexity of the merits, but ending the analysis with a binary remedy
can place more weight on the Court’s answer to the question than is
appropriate to the sensitivity of the inquiry. Facts can change, even the
constitutional sort, and lawmaking can be difficult. Courts should not
in the usual case invalidate a law while legislative remedial options remain on the table.
V. FORWARD
It is time at last for brass tacks. Where do we go from here? The
previous Part sought to emphasize that we need not go as far as the
shock of a case like the Pigeon-Feeding Case might suggest.650 Lower
court judges are bound by the Supreme Court’s doctrinal frames, but
the Court itself is not. Individual Justices have rejected the rights-astrumps ideology,651 and the Court already abandons its rule-like doc–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
647
648
649
650
651

570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 556–57.
551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See supra pp. 56–58.
See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730–31 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one
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trines selectively, including in Carpenter v. United States, discussed below.652 The Court could justify a transition to proportionality as a
means of providing needed coherence to what already occurs in disjointed, ad hoc, and unreflective ways.
Rejecting a rights-as-trumps ideology can affect real cases, three instances of which are highlighted below. In the first, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, proportionality analysis might well have changed the case’s
framing, and the case would have been a meet candidate for the remedial flexibility just discussed. The second case, Carpenter, shows how
categorical adjudication has bogged down Fourth Amendment doctrine
and led courts consistently to ask the wrong set of questions — about
what constitutes a search, instead of about what makes a search unreasonable. Finally, the Court’s partisan gerrymandering cases illuminate
the distortion rights as trumps produces: confronted with an actual pathology, the Court has retreated to a discourse of manageability that is
better suited to its standard constitutional docket.
A. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a misguided case from soup to cake. First,
the soup: the case was a flawed candidate for certiorari as it was framed.
Reconciling antidiscrimination law with religious freedom raises important constitutional and legal questions, but this case was a poor vehicle for addressing those questions. As noted, the parties agreed that,
as a general matter, an artistic baker has a First Amendment free speech
right to choose the messages he squirts onto his cakes and also that a
baker in Colorado cannot refuse or modify service to people based on
their sexual orientation.653 They disagreed about whether the baker’s
refusal to bake a cake for the couple’s wedding (but willingness to provide other services) constituted protected freedom of speech or unprotected sexual orientation discrimination.654 The record in the case
showed no epidemic of same-sex couples being refused artisanal cakes
from bakers willing to provide an off-the-rack alternative.655 The dignitary injury to the couple and the psychological trauma of the baker
were, by hypothesis, genuine and important, but the case offered, at
best, error correction that the Colorado Court of Appeals could have
handled just fine.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts
to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–103 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
652 See infra section V.B, pp. 124–27.
653 See supra p. 31.
654 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 4, 79.
655 The Court itself noted the insufficiency of the record, observing that the parties “disagree as
to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
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Of course, there was a reason Phillips grounded his right of refusal
primarily in freedom of speech rather than freedom of religion, and it
speaks to the merits. Phillips refused to bake the cake for Craig and
Mullins not because he was an artist but because he was a Christian.656
A freedom of religion frame would have set the issues in the terms in
which the litigants actually experienced them, but would have run into
a doctrinal hurdle. Under Employment Division v. Smith, a religious
objector has no First Amendment claim against a neutral law of general
applicability, such as the Colorado public accommodations law.657 As
section II.A.1 notes, Justice Scalia’s reason for so holding was precisely
the fear of a slippery slope to “anarchy” that this Foreword has criticized
courts for invoking.658 Prior to Smith, the Court was sensitive to the
notion that religious objections to laws that did not target religion could
not always win out, even if they had to be taken seriously.659 After
Smith, religious objectors instead frame their arguments in the comparatively absolutist discourse of free speech and various federal and state
religious freedom restoration acts.660 Smith does much mischief and
should be overruled.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s narrow opinion for the Court in
Masterpiece Cakeshop was born of the analytic distortion Smith produces. The conflict here called, above all, for sensitivity. As Justice
Kennedy emphasized, Phillips’s religious objection to what he viewed,
reasonably, as participation in a same-sex wedding was sincere and
deeply held.661 The State of Colorado’s commitment to nondiscrimination in public accommodations was equally sincere, deeply held, and
legally significant.662 But a free speech decision could not accommodate
the sensitivity the case demanded. Either Phillips had no free speech
claim — and therefore no claim at all, given Smith — or he had to win.
And if Phillips had to win, then — given the doctrine’s insensitivity to
content — so too did your average bigot. Whoever was destined to win
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority wanted to make both parties’
constitutional claims visible in a way that a free speech opinion lacked
the resources to accomplish.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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657
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Id. at 1724.
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (2017).
See supra section II.A.1, pp. 43–47.
See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447–53 (1988);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–09 (1961) (plurality opinion).
660 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014); State v.
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 562–66 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.); Christopher C. Lund, RFRA,
State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 165–71 (2016).
661 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
662 Id. at 1724–25 (reciting Colorado’s history of antidiscrimination laws).
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The Court found itself an exit ramp. Seizing on evidence that some
commissioners held Phillips’s religious views against him, the Court held
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s decision to hold him liable
was not neutral after all.663 By deflecting the legal error away from
either the Colorado legislature or Phillips and toward the stray comments of commissioners, Justice Kennedy was able to write an opinion
that deftly kept aloft both religious freedom and gay rights. The dodge
worked in this case, but it won’t work for long. At the time it decided
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court had before it the cert petition in
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington,664 an analogous case in which a
florist is defending her refusal to produce a bouquet for a same-sex wedding in both speech and religion terms.665 The Court must confront
Smith or face the same dilemma it deflected in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Proportionality would better enable a court to recognize that
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not involve simply a right pressed against a
government interest, but in fact involved a conflict of rights. The
Colorado public accommodations law deserves the double respect of being a duly passed state law and also being one that means to honor the
state’s constitutional obligation to respect the rights of its gay, lesbian,
and bisexual citizens. A rights claimant should bear a heavy burden of
persuasion in seeking to invalidate a law passed, in good faith, under
those circumstances.666 A binary, rights-as-trumps frame obscures the
state’s interest in Craig’s and Mullins’s rights.667
Courts facing similar issues under the European Convention on
Human Rights have felt liberated to recognize the multidimensional nature of the rights at issue. Most recently, in a series of cases on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as Lee v. McArthur,668
courts in Northern Ireland had to determine whether the Convention’s
protections for freedom of expression and religion gave Christian bakers
the right to refuse to bake a non-wedding cake that had a message of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
663
664
665

Id. at 1729–31.
State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2671.
Id. at 549–51. The Court vacated the state court decision in Arlene’s Flowers for reconsideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop. Arlene’s Flowers, 138 S. Ct. 2671.
666 It follows that the presence of a state RFRA would also be a relevant fact in addressing a
religious freedom claim brought by a claimant or defendant who discriminates on the basis of religion, though due attention would need to be paid in those circumstances to the demands of the
Establishment Clause. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
667 In holding that the Commission had violated Phillips’s religious freedom, the Court relied on
instances in which the Commission had found no liability for bakers who, for secular reasons, had
refused to write antigay messages on cakes. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. While the
state should not take religious objections to a customer’s request less seriously than secular ones —
if anything, it should do the opposite — the presence of a state statute protecting against antigay
discrimination makes the cases importantly different.
668 [2016] NICA 39 (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
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support for same-sex marriage.669 Both the County Court and the Court
of Appeal held for the customer, but both courts acknowledged and engaged with the claims on both sides.670 The bakers’ freedom of religion
was indeed implicated, those courts held, but because the relevant
accommodations regulations had been passed to implement a competing
obligation to protect against sexual orientation discrimination,
courts owed deference to the legislature in conducting proportionality
analysis.671
In an earlier case, Ladele v. London Borough of Islington,672 Lillian
Ladele, an employee of the local registrar of births, deaths, and marriages, refused to certify civil partnerships, newly available under a 2004
statute, on the basis of her Christian religious beliefs.673 Following a
disciplinary hearing regarding her refusal, the Registrar General gave
Ladele the option of signing paperwork for, but not conducting, such
ceremonies, but she refused.674 Ladele eventually resigned and brought
suit claiming religious discrimination in violation of the Convention.675
The case reached the European Court of Human Rights, which held
against her but not before accepting its obligation to “consider whether
the [Registrar’s] policy pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate.”676 The Registrar’s “indirect” religious discrimination against
Ladele, which would not be cognizable in the United States under
Smith, was not dispositive of her claim — indeed, she lost — but the
Strasbourg Court was sensitive to it.
Ladele foregrounds an issue that should have been but was not a
subject of discussion in Masterpiece Cakeshop: the remedy. The sloppy
hypotheticals the categorical frame encouraged the Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court to entertain obscured the path to a less coercive, less
binary resolution of the conflict. The substantial agreement between
the parties about the nature of each other’s rights naturally suggested a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
669 Id. [5]–[6]; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms arts. 9–10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. The case is currently pending before the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Mark Simpson, “Gay Cake”: Ashers Bakery Case Heard
at Supreme Court, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland43955734 [https://perma.cc/RY9T-6CTS].
670 Lee v. McArthur [2016] NICA 39, [61]–[67], [105]; Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2015] NICty 2,
[77]–[99].
671 Lee v. McArthur [2016] NICA 39, [70]; Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2015] NICty 2, [88]–[91]. I
bracket whether the courts were correct in construing the bakers’ refusal in this case as constituting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and therefore triggering that section of the applicable antidiscrimination regulations.
672 [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357 (Eng.), aff’d sub nom. Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 215.
673 Eweida, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 229–32 (describing Ladele’s case). Eweida combined Ladele’s
case with three others at the European Court of Human Rights. Id. at 223.
674 Id. at 231.
675 Id.; Ladele, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357, [5].
676 Eweida, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 260.
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mediated outcome, which neither the litigants nor the Court seemed to
consider. If the problem really was that a baker in Colorado has an
obligation to serve customers without regard to their sexual orientation,
but that for religious reasons Phillips could not personally bake the couple’s cake, then the Court could have (perhaps after mediation) required
Phillips to provide a customized cake to the couple that he was not personally obligated to bake.677
B. Carpenter v. United States
The Carpenter case is the latest in a string of Fourth Amendment
conflicts implicated by the panoptic technologies of the digital age.678
Timothy Carpenter was a suspect in a series of armed robberies.679 At
trial, the government introduced cell-tower data identifying the locations from which Carpenter’s mobile phone placed and received calls
over a four-month period that included the robberies at issue.680 The
government had not obtained a search warrant for the call records, but
the trial court denied Carpenter’s suppression motion.681
The Fourth Amendment reads in relevant part: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”682 The question in
Carpenter was not, however, whether it was unreasonable for the police
to have searched call records for Carpenter’s mobile phone under the
circumstances of the investigation. The question, rather, was whether
examining those records constituted a search at all.683
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
677 Both France and the United Kingdom have relied, through legislation, on somewhat analogous requirements for healthcare providers raising conscience objections to performing abortions.
See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 187, 210 (Susanna Mancini & Michel
Rosenfeld eds., 2018); The National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/291, art. 16, ¶ 3(2)(e) (Eng.) (requiring “prompt referral to another provider of
primary medical services who does not have such conscientious objections”); Loi 75-17 du 17 janvier
1975 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law 75-17 of January 17, 1975 Regarding
the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 18, 1975, p. 739, arts. L 162-3, L 162-8 (requiring
objectors to supply names and addresses of alternative providers).
678 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (holding that police generally may not
search digital contents of a cell phone seized at arrest); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66
(2013) (holding that police may generally take DNA swabs at arrest); United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle constitutes a
search).
679 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
680 Id.
681 Id.
682 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
683 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17.
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That question might sound to lay ears as if the questioner is not an
advanced English speaker, but before the Court’s decision in his favor,
Fourth Amendment doctrine supplied some reason for skepticism about
Carpenter’s argument. A simple hypothetical tells us why. Suppose
Carpenter had contemporaneously told a friend where he was at the
time of each robbery, and the police had put the friend on the witness
stand. A Fourth Amendment suppression motion would appear frivolous under the circumstances. Here, Carpenter gave his mobile carrier
his locational data, and the carrier, like the hypothetical friend, then
supplied it to police.684 As Justice Kennedy wrote (in dissent) of earlier
cases involving documents in the hands of third parties: “The defendants had no reason to believe the records were owned or controlled by
them and so could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
records.”685
Still, it is at least counterintuitive to suppose that the Constitution
imposes no obligation — not even of reasonableness — on the behavior
of police in this circumstance. Most Americans carry cell phones and
do not expect in doing so to have consented to unconstrained warrantless surveillance by the police. Chief Justice Roberts noted for the majority “the seismic shifts in digital technology” that allow long-term
tracking of everyone’s location.686 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote,
“Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses.
Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they
are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.”687
By now the reader has spotted the telltale distortions of rights as
trumps: two opposite positions, both somehow obviously correct, producing the standard bilateral rancor that a paradox of this sort reliably
generates. The Fourth Amendment states a standard — reasonableness — but it is policed by rules that flatten the inquiry.688 Fourth
Amendment doctrine draws a line between searches, which generally
require probable cause and a warrant or else exclusion from trial, and
nonsearches, which are generally free from constitutional constraint.689
As Professor Anthony Amsterdam wrote nearly forty-five years ago,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
684
685
686
687
688

Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2219 (majority opinion).
Id.
See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (“[T]he definition of ‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the [Fourth Amendment’s] warrant
clause.”).
689 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221. But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (rejecting the idea
that “the Fourth Amendment does not come into play” in cases that stop short of a “full-blown
search”).
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“this kind of all-or-nothing approach to the amendment puts extraordinary strains upon the process of drawing its outer boundary lines.”690
Since the consequence of labeling a warrantless intrusion a “search”
is loss of the acquired evidence and its fruits,691 courts are understandably reluctant to expand this category without introducing a patchwork
of ad hoc exceptions.692 “It would obviously be easier and more likely
for a court to say that a patrolman’s shining of a flashlight into the
interior of a parked car was a ‘search,’” Amsterdam writes, “if that conclusion did not encumber the flashlight with a warrant requirement but
simply required, for example, that the patrolman ‘be able to point to
specific and articulable facts’ supporting a reasonable inference that
something in the car required his attention.”693 This Term, in fact, in
Collins v. Virginia,694 the Court invalidated a warrantless search of a
motorcycle parked in a driveway that would have been nothing but good
policing had the motorcycle been parked on the sidewalk in front of the
house.695 Justice Alito, the lone dissenter, remarked that “[a]n ordinary
person of common sense would react to the Court’s decision the way
Mr. Bumble famously responded when told about a legal rule that did
not comport with the reality of everyday life. If that is the law, he exclaimed, ‘the law is a ass — a idiot.’”696 He’s not wrong.
The third-party doctrine is likewise the sequela of a Fourth
Amendment categoricalism that made Carpenter a difficult case. The
doctrine provides that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”697 The Court
has applied the doctrine, for example, to financial records given to
banks,698 to a pen register placed by a telephone company to record the
numbers a customer has dialed,699 and more generally, to observations
of an individual’s public movements, including from the air.700 Qua
rule, the third-party doctrine appears to be unique to the United
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
690
691

Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 388.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340–
41 (1939).
692 See Amar, supra note 38, at 757 (“Warrants are not required — unless they are. All searches
and seizures must be grounded in probable cause — but not on Tuesdays.”); Amsterdam, supra note
39, at 349 (“For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court’s
most successful product.”).
693 Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 393 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
694 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018).
695 Id. at 1668; see also id. at 1680–81 (Alito, J., dissenting).
696 Id. at 1681 (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 277 (1867)).
697 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
698 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
699 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
700 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
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States.701 Not just that, but some jurisdictions have specifically and
intentionally distanced themselves from U.S. case law in this area.702
Fourth Amendment doctrine has become a jurisprudence of warrants instead of reasonableness. There plainly are instances in which
we want, and reasonably should want, police to effect searches or seizures without a warrant, and so the approach has been to set off an
endless series of exceptions for exigencies, border searches, consent,
Terry703 stops, and so on.704 These exceptions are arbitrary, and they
produce safe harbors that do not always match our intuitions, as in
Carpenter. We want the police to conduct certain kinds of warrantless
searches sometimes but not always. Proportionality jurisdictions tend
to engage these weighty questions directly rather than load them onto a
definitional frame that cannot bear their weight.
There are areas of law in which a hard-edged rule is appropriate.705
Maybe the cost of legal uncertainty is too high to bear. Maybe we do
not trust contextual judgment calls made by officers, judges, or jurors
within certain contexts such as criminal justice.
The Fourth
Amendment might be an area in which rules are necessary. But in light
of rapidly evolving surveillance technology, that judgment should be
made with our eyes open to the relative costs and benefits. Rights as
trumps builds walls that obstruct our gaze.
C. The Gerrymandering Cases
Partisan gerrymandering cases reflect the wages of crying wolf.706 A
core theme of this Foreword has been that a constitutional court’s frame
for rights adjudication should fit its paradigm rights cases. The rightsas-trumps frame might well suit a rights regime whose paradigm cases
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
701 See Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data: A Comparative Analysis, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATESECTOR DATA 5, 28–29 (Fred H. Cate & James X. Dempsey eds., 2017) (“The United States is more
or less unique in affording no constitutional protection to third-party data . . . .”).
702 See, e.g., Dist. Registrar & Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496, 519–23 (India);
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., THE RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNET AND IN THE WIDER DIGITAL WORLD § 4.4.3 at 91–92 (2014); Ruth Levush, Online
Privacy Law: Israel, LAW.GOV (June 2012), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/2012/
israel.php [https://perma.cc/7W9B-5QRD] (translating the Israeli Attorney General’s 2007 Directives Regarding Transfer of Information from Telephone Companies to Bodies with Investigation
Authority).
703 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
704 See Amar, supra note 38, at 762–70.
705 See Jackson, supra note 114, at 3168 (suggesting that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
and the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and association are less suited to proportionality analysis).
706 Cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
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are pathological, where courts must defend the very existence of individual rights against government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption.
When, instead, the paradigm cases arise from the potential overreach or
clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual social
problems, rights adjudication must be sensitive to a democratic people’s
first-order right to govern itself.
For years, the constitutional discourse around partisan gerrymandering has gotten it just backward. This Term, the Court heard gerrymandering cases arising out of Maryland and Wisconsin, ultimately deferring any merits decision in both on procedural grounds.707 In Maryland,
Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley testified at trial that it was
“clearly [his] intent” to help Democrats win, and another Democrat said
one of the districts was redrawn to “minimize the voice of the
Republicans.”708 The firm the Democrats hired to draw the district map
was instructed only to devise one that “would produce a 7 to 1 congressional delegation” and would protect “the six incumbent Democrats.”709
Evidence in the Wisconsin case likewise revealed a process designed
“to secure Republican control of the Assembly under any likely future
electoral scenario for the remainder of the decade, in other words to
entrench the Republican Party in power.”710
A political party that constructs district lines intentionally to maintain its own partisan advantage is simply corrupt. Its behavior falls
squarely, almost comically, into the second paragraph of Carolene
Products footnote four: “[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”711 A legislature that deliberately tries to wall itself
off from democratic change through the manipulation of district lines
should forfeit that power, at least temporarily. Courts that find racial
gerrymandering or racial vote dilution routinely order that district lines
be drawn by special masters.712 Such an order would be strong medicine
in a partisan gerrymandering case, but willful constitutional violations
call for strong remedies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
707 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944 (2018) (holding that the balance of equities and the
public interest tilted against plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction); Gill v. Whitford, 138
S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (holding that plaintiffs failed to prove standing).
708 Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 817 (D. Md. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), aff’d,
138 S. Ct. 1942.
709 Id.
710 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S.
Ct. 1916; see also Richard Pildes, The Brazenness of Partisan Intent in the Court’s Gerrymandering
Cases, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 15, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=99065
[https://perma.cc/U5HC-6BDH] (referring to “bald evidence of partisan intent to manipulate the
map” in Wisconsin).
711 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
712 Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting
Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (2005).
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Legalized partisan gerrymandering is unheard of in other mature democracies.713 That’s not because of happy pluralism; it’s because we’re
wrong. As all nine Justices affirmed in Vieth v. Jubelirer,714 the last
partisan gerrymandering case to reach the Court before this Term, the
practice is plainly undemocratic.715 The concerns expressed in Vieth
and at oral argument in Gill v. Whitford716 (the Wisconsin case) and
Benisek v. Lamone717 (the Maryland case) relate to the “manageability”
of judicial intervention.718 Because all redistricting involves political
choices, including the appropriate basis for political representation, it
can be difficult for a court to say with confidence when a state legislature has ventured too far. It should be clear by now that a court’s refusal
to address an egregious rights violation based on concerns about
hypothetical cases not before the court is just the kind of distortion that
rights as trumps produces and that motivates this Foreword.
But the problem runs deeper here because transparent partisan gerrymandering actually serves an illicit purpose. Proportionality analysis
would encourage the Court to be less concerned with articulating the
boundaries of the right and more concerned with a purpose that aligns,
negatively, with most Americans’ sense of political morality. Manageability has less of a role to play when the government is acting in bad
faith. The Court’s obvious avoidance strategy in Gill and Benisek is
propelled by concerns that do not match the nature of the government’s
behavior. The Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii,719 in which it upheld the President’s entry restrictions on nationals from certain predominantly Muslim countries, likewise leaned on the need for political deference — authority over justification — without sufficient attention to
transparent religious bigotry on the part of the Executive.720 Rights as
trumps is born of what Professor Judith Shklar calls the “liberalism of
fear,”721 but it can quickly lose its resolve on contact with the real world.
Fear of manageability should, by contrast, be a crucial consideration
when rights adjudication obstructs the efforts of the political branches
to address genuine social problems. It should have been a major concern
in cases such as Citizens United, Parents Involved, and Shelby
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
713 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 789–
90 (2013).
714 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
715 Id. at 292 (plurality opinion).
716 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
717 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018).
718 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable
standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged”).
719 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
720 See id. at 2435–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
721 See SHKLAR, supra note 453, at 237.
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County.722 The absence of a discourse of manageability from those cases
reflects the Court’s misplaced view that what triggers the need for aggressive remediation is the identity of the right invoked rather than the
egregiousness of the government’s actual behavior. The ongoing search
for First Amendment language with which to state the objection to gerrymandering reflects this orientation.723
The Court’s approach to reapportionment further exacerbates the
problem. There, the Court has applied exacting scrutiny to any departure from mathematical equality in congressional districting and to population differences of at least ten percent in state legislative districting.724 Treating one person, one vote as a trump has made it a
problematic comparator in other cases implicating the districting process.725 It has lulled the Court into associating review of political pathologies with administrable remedies rather than addressing the
pathology itself.
An alternative approach to both gerrymandering and apportionment
cases would be to pathologize intentional vote dilution in much the way
the Brown Court pathologized racial segregation. No serious democratic
concern inheres in districts failing to achieve precise mathematical
equality. There are many potential bases for representation apart from
individual persons,726 and the census is itself an approximation that deteriorates in quality over the course of a decade. Malapportionment and
partisan gerrymandering become democratic problems, rather, when
they serve purely partisan or self-interested ends.727 Districts that follow
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
722
723

In Shelby County, the “rights” were those of states. 570 U.S. 529, 543–44 (2013).
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.
Ct. 1916, 1934, 1938–40 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
724 Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 730–31 (1983).
725 For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court held that a claim of
racial vote dilution required a showing of intentionality that could tidy the judicial inquiry. See id.
at 66 (plurality opinion). Congress promptly responded by incorporating an “effects” test into
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. IV 2016)).
726 Indeed, single-member districting, which remains a federal requirement for U.S. House seats,
see Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491, implicitly disclaims individuals rather than communities
as the most relevant democratic unit. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205, 209–14.
727 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 673–74 (1998). Intentional partisan gerrymandering is
indeed more objectionable than racial gerrymandering claims recognized under Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993). A Shaw claim arises any time race is the “predominant factor” in drawing a district
line, see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995), but it does not require the use of race to be
invidious. By contrast, intentional partisan gerrymandering is necessarily designed to harm others.
See Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1993, 2030–31 (2018). As Professor Justin Levitt notes, the appropriate race-based analogue
is not Shaw but rather the egregious Jim Crow–era racial gerrymander invalidated in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). See Levitt, supra, at 2031.
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traditional municipal boundaries but are (to a point) unequal in size
should be much preferred to those that are motivated by partisan entrenchment but are precisely equal numerically.
The susceptibility of malapportionment to a trumping rule of the sort
the Court has been grasping for just means that bad actors dilute votes
by gerrymandering instead of by creating unequal districts. As in other
areas, proportionality analysis would help to shift the Court’s gaze away
from the particular abstracted right at stake — whether grounded in the
Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, or elsewhere — and toward the government’s actual behavior and motivations. When a legislator or governor tells you he is trying to alter district lines in order to
make it more difficult for his political opponents to win elections, there
is no need for sociological gobbledygook.728 This wolf comes as a
wolf.729
VI. CONCLUSION
Lenin had a point when (it is claimed) he said liberty is “so precious
that it must be rationed.”730 Too many individual claims of liberty
would “court anarchy,”731 and so a functioning state must either restrict
the number of such claims or limit what follows from them. This
Foreword has argued that the latter course fits constitutional adjudication in a mature democracy whose citizens experience themselves as
rights-bearers but who nonetheless must cohabit a working ecosystem.
If rights are trumps, we had better be sure we get them right. But we
can’t be sure, and it is costly to pretend that we are.
We live in interesting times, beset with challenges, but they are different from those of our forebears. The core case is no longer to defend
downtrodden groups from organized oppression by the state, even as
much of that work remains.732 Increasingly, as Madison foresaw, we are
called upon to defend the state against permanent capture by selfinterested factions. Having more or less resolved basic normative questions of political participation, we must now construct a politics to go
with it.
When this chapter of the nation’s history is written, what will be
said of our constitutional law? The Constitution’s endurance motivates
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
728 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally ELY,
supra note 47, at 77–88.
729 Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
730 2 SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, SOVIET COMMUNISM: A NEW CIVILISATION?
1036 (1936).
731 See supra p. 45.
732 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2441–42 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Michael D.
Shear et al., Trump Retreats on Separating Families, but Thousands May Remain Apart, N.Y.
TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2I7wWAA [https://perma.cc/84SQ-SLDL].
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its resistance to new technologies of rights adjudication, but that endurance is itself underwritten by constitutional law’s amenability to change.
Our constitutional tradition has resisted calls to adhere to the past for
its own sake. It has resisted calls for a stubborn parochialism that ignores the lessons of others around the world who face similar social,
political, and legal challenges. The latest challenge is for us to see, hear,
speak to, and live with one another, and courts must find their place in
surmounting it. Judges are imperfect, but they are better suited than
others to view rights conflicts from a distance, to investigate the truth,
and to resolve such controversies respectfully, without fear or favor.733
Constitutional law may fail us yet, but it carries within its name an
implicit, and poignant, promise to the people it serves. Now is the time
for redemption.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
733 See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 410–12 (2016); Andrew
J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2005) (finding that judges have difficulty ignoring inadmissible evidence but are able to do so in cases implicating constitutional rights).

